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1 
PENSIONERS, BONDHOLDERS, AND UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION IN MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY 
Andrew B. Dawson† 
Detroit recently confirmed its plan of debt adjustment under which the 
city has endeavored to adjust its pension obligations.  The court’s 
confirmation order and oral opinion on the record present what is perhaps 
the most significant decision regarding a key question facing any city 
attempting to adjust pensions in bankruptcy: can a city propose to pay its 
pension claimants significantly more than its other unsecured creditors?  
This question involves interpreting the Bankruptcy Code’s unfair 
discrimination rule. 
The Detroit bankruptcy court applied a novel interpretation of unfair 
discrimination, eschewing the relatively thin body of case law interpreting 
this rule, and suggesting that the rule should have a municipal bankruptcy-
specific meaning. 
This article contends that there is no need for such a specialized 
interpretation of unfair discrimination.  Many of the factors that motivated 
the court’s departure from the case law can actually be addressed more 
effectively under the case law developed for corporate reorganization.  
Adhering to the corporate reorganization statute has statutory and historical 
support.  Further, such a rule would provide a more workable structure for 
determining when discrimination is unfair. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Unfunded pension obligations are the major story in municipal 
financial distress, as cities struggle to meet their pension obligations while 
still meeting their other debt obligations, investing in infrastructure 
improvements, and providing services to residents.
1
  States face significant 
obstacles in addressing the problem of underfunded pensions on their own.
2
  
Not only do states face the usual Contracts Clause constraints on impairing 
contractual obligations, but some states give constitutional protection to 
pension obligations.
3
 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Chicago’s Mind Blowing $33 Billion Debt and Pension 
Obligations, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/11/18/chicagos-mind-blowing-33-billion-debt-and-pension-
obligations/ (describing Chicago’s challenge of properly funding its pensions); see also A 
Widening Gap in Cities: Shortfalls in Funding for Pensions and Retiree Health Care, PEW 
CENTER (Jan. 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2013/ 
Pew_city_pensions_report.pdf (reporting that the largest 61 cities in the United States had 
pension shortfalls of $99 billion in fiscal year 2009, a number which increased 15% among 
the 40 reporting cities in 2010). 
 2.  Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 
EDUCATION, FINANCE & POLICY 617, 617 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573864 (providing “an overview of the legal limitations on the 
ability of states to amend their existing pension plans with respect to current participants.”). 
 3.  Id., (listing Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7), Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. 
XXIX, § 1), New York (N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7) and Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5) as 
examples).  As described below, Michigan likewise has such a constitutional pension 
protection. 
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Faced with the prospect of defaulting on bond obligations, driving out 
residents by imposing even higher property taxes, and cutting important 
services, municipalities have looked to Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code
4
 
as a means to adjust their pension obligations.  Most notably, the City of 
Detroit’s bankruptcy filing has brought this issue to the forefront, but it is 
not alone.  Already, the city of Central Falls, Rhode Island, has restructured 
its pension obligations through Chapter 9,
5
 and Stockton, California, 
considered doing so as well.
6
 
In all three of these cities, a major question was whether the city could 
confirm a plan that provided for a significantly larger recovery for pension 
claimants than for other unsecured claimants, namely the municipal 
bondholders.  That is, even if pension claims have the same distribution 
priority as bondholders and other unsecured claimants, can the city 
nevertheless favor pensioners over other claimants (or vice versa)?  
Bankruptcy law permits a debtor to separately classify creditors, with each 
class of creditors entitled to vote on the plan.  If any class opposes the 
debtor’s plan of adjustment, the court may nonetheless confirm the plan 
only if it finds that “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and 
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired 
under, and has not accepted, the plan.”
7
 
While the Bankruptcy Code goes on to define what is included in the 
“fair and equitable” requirement, the Code does not explain the meaning of 
“discriminate unfairly.”
8
  Until recently, this unfair discrimination rule had 
not arisen under Chapter 9 and, until the recent municipal bankruptcy 
filings in Detroit and Stockton, this rule had received very little scholarly 
attention.
9
 
 
 4.   11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2010).  Chapter 9 provides for the adjustment of debts of a 
“municipality,” defined as a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a 
State.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2010). 
 5.  In re Centr. Falls, 468 B.R. 36, 72 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012). 
 6.  In re Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 777 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). 
 7.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2010). 
 8.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2010). 
 9.  Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 33 REV.  BANKING & FIN. L. 609 (2014) [hereinafter Hynes & Walt, Pensions & 
Property Rights] (analyzing the priority in payment of a municipality’s pension obligations); 
Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal 
Bankruptcy 1  (Virginia Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2014-55, 2014), 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493529 [hereinafter Hynes & Walt, Fair & Unfair 
Discrimination] (describing the law defining the unfair discrimination standard and the 
categories of circumstances where discrimintion between co-equal classes is allowed) ; C. 
Scott Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L. J. 
85, 114 (2014); see also  DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., CAN PENSIONS BE RESTRUCTURED IN 
(DETROIT’S) MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY? 4 (2013), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/can-pensions-be-restructured-in-detroits-municipal-bankruptcy 
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 Even though Central Falls, Stockton, and Detroit all ultimately gave 
superior treatment to some group of claimants relative to other similarly 
situated claimants, only in Detroit did the court have to squarely confront 
the unfair discrimination rule.  Central Falls effectively paid its 
bondholders in full while reducing its pension obligations by half, but the 
pensioners consented to this treatment.
10
 Stockton ultimately declined to 
impair its pension obligations, effectively paying them in full, while 
distributing only a negligible amount to other unsecured creditors.
11
 In that 
case, though, the unsecured creditors were placed in the same class as the 
pension claimants and that class approved the plan; hence, the unfair 
discrimination rule did not apply.
12
 
Detroit’s bankruptcy confirmation, on the other hand, had to address 
the unfair discrimination rule even after the city had settled with the most 
vocal plan opponents.  The court articulated a novel interpretation of this 
rule, providing perhaps the most significant such decision since the 
Supreme Court’s depression-era cases of Avon Park
13
 and Paradise 
Irrigation District.
14
  The court stated that determining whether 
discrimination among creditor classes is unfair is a matter to be determined 
according the court’s “judgment of its conscience regarding that 
discrimination.”
15
 
The court’s articulation of this rule rejects case law interpreting unfair 
discrimination in the context of corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code. This departure reflects, in part at least, the court’s 
concern that unfair discrimination be interpreted in light of the purpose of 
municipal bankruptcy law.  Thus, the court considered “mission-related” 
justification for Detroit’s decision to discriminate among classes of 
unsecured creditors.
16
 
 
(analyzing the legality of restructuring Detroit’s bankruptcy). 
 10.  Steven Church & Steve Ludsin, Central Falls, Rhode Island, Bankruptcy Exit 
Approved, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-
06/central-falls-rhode-island-bankruptcy-exit-approved.html. 
 11.  Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Approves Bankruptcy Exit for Stockton, Cali., NEW 
YORK TIMES DEAL BOOK (October 30, 2014),  http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/ 
judge-approves-bankruptcy-exit-for-stockton-calif/?_r=0.  
 12.   Id. 
 13.  Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 141 (1940) 
(discussed infra in Part III.A.1). 
 14.  Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 538 (1946) (discussed infra in 
Part III.A.2). 
 15.  Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes at 30,  In re City of Detroit Bankr., 
No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. MI. Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/notices/Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_Confirmation_Judge_Rhodes_FI
NAL_for_Release.pdf . 
      16.   Id. 
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This article contends that the court’s analysis can be – and should be – 
viewed through the analytical framework that was developed by Professor 
Bruce Markell and adopted by many courts in corporate reorganization 
cases.
17
  That framework, the Markell Test, permits discrimination to the 
extent it comports with the parties’ ex ante expectations or compensates the 
favored party for contributions to the reorganization.
18
  This latter factor is 
at times referred to as the “new value corollary.”
19
  The Markell Test 
considers many of the same factors that informed the Detroit court’s 
judgment.  Furthermore, this article contends that the new value corollary, 
properly interpreted, more effectively addresses the court’s mission-related 
concerns. 
The article begins with a description of Chapter 9’s structure and 
policies.  Chapter 9 is a pared-down form of Chapter 11’s corporation 
reorganization law, including many of the Chapter 11 procedures for 
negotiating and confirming a debt composition plan.  But, Chapter 9 
intentionally excludes most of Chapter 11’s creditor protections, as 
Congress has attempted to carefully craft Chapter 9 to minimize federal 
intrusion into municipal governance.  Thus, while Chapter 11 serves the 
dual (and sometimes inconsistent) purposes of promoting reorganization 
and of maximizing returns to creditors, Chapter 9’s purpose is solely to 
confirm a debt composition plan. 
Part II focuses on the unfair discrimination rule’s function within the 
limited structure and scope of Chapter 9.  This rule limits how the 
municipal debtor may allocate its reorganization value among similarly 
situated classes of creditors.  Although this rule has not played a significant 
role in corporate reorganizations, it is likely to do so in municipal 
bankruptcies, especially to the extent municipal debtors seek to impair their 
pension obligations under Chapter 9. 
Part III then analyzes the meaning of the unfair discrimination rule, 
first looking at its historical meaning under Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898.  Then, consistent with that historical use and with Chapter 9’s 
incorporation of the unfair discrimination rule from Chapter 11, this part 
will then examine the Chapter 11 case law interpreting the unfair 
discrimination rule. 
Part IV then discusses how these rules should be interpreted in the 
Chapter 9 context.  This part argues that the unfair discrimination rule 
should be interpreted the same in Chapter 9 as in Chapter 11; however, the 
new value corollary within the unfair discrimination rule should be applied 
 
   17.   Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998) (discussed in detail infra Part III.B.2). 
     18.    Id. at  242. 
     19.    David R. Kuney, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 505, 505 n.3 (1999)  
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more flexibly in municipal bankruptcies.  While there is some policy 
support for a narrow interpretation of new value in Chapter 11, consistent 
with that chapter’s structure and policy, the structure and policies of 
Chapter 9 require a more flexible approach in municipal bankruptcies.  
This approach would provide a more predictable and useful tool in 
analyzing unfair discrimination issues, as it would provide a structure for 
determining not just whether discrimination is fair but also how much 
discrimination is fair.  It would further provide a better framework for 
dealing with the challenging question of the relative treatment of tort and 
other involuntary creditors. 
I. CHAPTER 9’S STRUCTURE AND POLICY 
Municipal bankruptcy law shares key features of corporate 
reorganization law.
20
  For this article, the key similarity is that both 
Chapters 9 and 11 are constructed around the confirmation of a debt 
composition plan, which confirmation carries with it the “extraordinary 
power” to bind even dissenting creditors.
21
  At the same time, though, there 
are important and significant differences between Chapter 9 and Chapter 
11.  This section describes the similarities and key differences between the 
two chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, and it argues that these differences 
reflect the different policies underlying these chapters.
22
 
The main similarity between municipal and corporate bankruptcy law 
is the centerpiece of a debt composition plan.  Chapter 9 directly 
incorporates many of Chapter 11’s plan-related provisions – for instance, it 
incorporates the rules relating to the classification of claims
23
, acceptance 
 
 20.  See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 410 (2014) (highlighting that authors have compared municipal 
bankruptcy law to corporate bankruptcy, striking similarities between Chapter 9 and Chapter 
11); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 356 (2010) (describing municipal bankruptcy law as “corporate 
bankruptcy mutatis mutandis”). 
 21.  See Pryor, supra note 9, at 114 (“The extraordinary power of plan confirmation lies 
in its power to bind non-consenting members of a class when the class votes in favor of the 
plan.”).  As discussed infra, this is handled in two ways.  First, creditor voting is by class, 
such that a class as a whole may approve the plan over the objections of a minority of the 
class members.  Second, even if a class of creditors opposes the plan, the court may 
nonetheless impose the plan over that objection if the requirements of Section 1129(b) are 
satisfied. 
 22.  Moringiello, supra note 20, at 410 (“Constitutional concerns, coupled with 
municipal bankruptcy’s original limited goal of solving the holdout problem, explain the 
somewhat skeletal nature of Chapter 9.”). 
 23.  11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1978). 
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of the plan by class,
24
 and most of the plan confirmation requirements.
25
  In 
other aspects, Chapter 9 draws from Chapter 11 with slight variations.  For 
example, under Chapter 11, the debtor has the exclusive right to propose a 
plan during the first 120 days of the case, after which creditors can propose 
a plan,
26
 while under Chapter 9 only the debtor has the right to propose a 
plan.
27
 
At the same time, though, Chapter 9 significantly departs from other 
aspects of Chapter 11’s plan negotiation process in two primary ways.  
First, Chapter 9 does not include Chapter 11’s statutory priority structure; 
second, Chapter 9 does not include many of Chapter 11’s creditor 
protections.  These protections give creditors governance rights in 
corporate reorganization, i.e., which give creditors the ability to participate 
in corporate decision making within the bankruptcy context.
28
  Each of 
these will be discussed in turn in the following sections. 
A. Statutory Priority Schemes 
Chapter 11 imposes a statutory priority structure that accords 
distribution priority to special claimants, such as administrative expenses, 
employee wage claims, and certain unpaid taxes.
29
  Thus, a plan under 
Chapter 11 must pay priority creditors in full before distributing any value 
to the general unsecured creditors.  For example, a corporate debtor must 
pay employees’ back wages (up to the statutory limit
30
) before paying 
general unsecured obligations to trade creditors. 
Chapter 9, in contrast, prioritizes only administrative expense claims.
31
  
There are no other priority unsecured claims in the municipal bankruptcy 
context, such that there is no requirement that employees’ unpaid wages be 
paid ahead of other general unsecured creditors – all unsecured claims 
incurred before the bankruptcy petition share equal priority.
32
 
The legislative history is silent as to why Chapter 9 does not include 
 
 24.  11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1984). 
 25.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(8), (a)(10), (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B) 
(2010). 
 26.  11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2005). 
 27.  11 U.S.C. § 941 (1978). 
 28.  See Moringiello, supra note 20, at 456 (detailing Congress’ merging of standard 
bankruptcy law with features of corporate bankruptcy). 
 29.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(8) (2010), respectively. 
 30.  Currently, that amount is $12,475 for unpaid wages earned in the six months prior 
to the bankruptcy petition.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2010). 
 31.  11 U.S.C. § 901 (2010) (incorporating only Section 507(a)(2) from the creditor 
priorities section). 
 32.  Pryor, supra note 9, at 120 (arguing that the lack of statutory priorities means that 
all unsecured creditors should be treated equally). 
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these statutory priorities.  Perhaps it reflects a policy decision to make 
Chapter 9 “plain vanilla” in order to ensure that it is as useful to as many 
states as possible – that is, Congress may have been reluctant to impose 
statutory priorities out of fear that these priorities might make Chapter 9 
either unattractive or simply unworkable in some states.  Hynes and Walt 
argue, for instance, that a uniform federal priority for pensioners might not 
be workable given that “[s]tates can differ with respect to their central and 
local fiscal conditions, as well as in the extent to which they regulate 
pension obligations incurred by their municipalities.”
33
  A federal rule of 
priority might even deter states from using Chapter 9, as it would “force 
some states to allocate the direct and indirect costs of a municipal 
bankruptcy in a way they would not prefer.”
34
 
Perhaps Congress intended for states to prioritize their own debts.
35
  
While under modern bankruptcy law, state law priorities do not apply in 
bankruptcy unless the Bankruptcy Code specifically incorporates them, this 
was not the case when Congress enacted the first municipal bankruptcy 
law.
36
  Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938, bankruptcy law incorporated state 
law creditor priorities.
37
  Thus, when Congress enacted the first municipal 
bankruptcy laws in 1934 and 1937, federal bankruptcy law honored state-
created priorities.  When Congress eliminated state law priorities from the 
bankruptcy laws in the Chandler Act, Congress simply never amended the 
municipal bankruptcy laws to address this change.  Thus, perhaps the 
continued lack of statutory priorities is simply an accident of history. 
Finally, it may be that Congress deliberately refused to impose 
statutory priorities out of federalism concerns, as any distributional 
requirements would impose federal policies on the state.
38
  This explanation 
 
 33.  Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 660. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See Adam J. Levitin, Detroit Eligibility and Pensions, CREDITSLIPS, (Dec. 3, 2013, 
8:45 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/12/detroit-eligibility-and 
pensions.html (suggesting that the municipal bankruptcy laws leave room for state priorities 
and arguing for the implicit use of states prioritizing their own debts). 
 36.  See David Skeel, What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy 9 (Univ. of 
Penn. Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Paper No. 1387, 2014), available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2388&context=faculty_scholar
ship (“As originally enacted, the 1898 Act incorporated any nonbankruptcy priorities that 
were honored under state or federal law. Concerned that there was little or nothing left for 
general unsecured creditors in most cases after state law priorities were satisfied, lawmakers 
largely eliminated state law priorities under the Chandler Act of 1938, which made major 
changes to the 1898 Act.”). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See, e.g., Lynn Hume, Bill Would Give More Rights to Municipal Employees in 
Bankruptcies, SOURCEMEDIA (June 4, 2014), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/washington-
budget-finance/bill-would-give-more-rights-to-municipal-employees-in-bankruptcies-
1063100-1.html (raising the federalism concern of states being governed by federal rules).  
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seems entirely consistent with Congress’s continued care to ensure that 
municipal bankruptcy law does not overstep into local municipal 
governance. 
Whatever the reason or justification, Congress has opted to not impose 
a federal priority scheme on municipal debtors in Chapter 9, a decision in 
line with its decision to leave debtors in control of municipal governance. 
B. Governance Mechanisms 
Governance-wise, Chapter 11 empowers creditors to participate in 
corporate decision making in ways not allowed in Chapter 9.
39
  For 
instance, corporate creditors have the right to be heard relating to any non-
ordinary course business decisions the debtor may want to pursue
40
; may 
move to have a trustee appointed to displace management
41
; and may 
propose their own plan of reorganization if the debtor fails to propose one 
or fails to propose one that garners sufficient creditor support.
42
  None of 
these governance provisions are applicable in Chapter 9.  In fact, Chapter 9 
specifically prohibits any interference with municipal governance.  Section 
903 acknowledges that a state retains the power “to control, by legislation 
or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the 
political or governmental powers of such municipality, including 
expenditures for such exercise.”
43
  Section 904 further prohibits court 
interference with municipal governance: 
 
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor 
consents or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, 
order or decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere with – 
Any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; 
Any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or 
The debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing     
property.
44
 
 
 39.  Some, in fact, have characterized corporate bankruptcy as a component of 
corporate governance generally. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, The Careful Use of 
Comparative Law Data: The Case of Corporate Insolvency Systems, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 193, 195 (“Most recently, a theory of insolvency law is evolving that views 
bankruptcy as a corporate governance mechanism. Perhaps because my interest in 
bankruptcy has evolved from earlier research into patterns of debt financing, I have 
subscribed to a governance view of bankruptcy.”). 
 40.  11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2010). 
 41.  11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2010). 
 42.  11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2005). 
 43.  11 U.S.C. § 903 (1984). 
 44.  11 U.S.C. § 904 (1978). 
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While there has been some debate about whether municipal 
bankruptcy law should impose more governance restrictions, it clearly does 
not do so now.
45
  As Juliet Moringiello explains, Chapter 9’s focus on debt 
adjustment – and exclusion of reorganization governance – reflects both 
constitutional concerns as well as “municipal bankruptcy’s original limited 
goal of solving the holdout problem.”
46
 
When Congress created the first municipal bankruptcy law in 1934, it 
did so with the narrow purpose of providing a means for municipalities to 
re-negotiate their bond debts.
47
  At the time, under the then-current 
Contracts Clause jurisprudence, it was understood that any state law 
procedure to re-negotiate bond debt requires unanimous bondholder 
consent, as imposing terms on a dissenting holdout bondholder would be an 
unconstitutional impairment of contract.
48
  Thus, municipal bankruptcy law 
under Chapter IX was structured to address this one problem, and this one 
problem alone. 
The singular focus of Chapter IX was evident in its structure.  A 
municipal debtor could obtain bankruptcy relief only after negotiating a 
plan of debt composition that had been approved by a majority of its 
creditors.
49
  This entry-level requirement made it practically impossible for 
 
 45.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 494 (1993) (“We 
believe that federal bankruptcy law warrants serious reexamination. In its present form, it 
serves little use: it does little to address serious city problems and, by restricting state laws 
directed at solving the holdout problem, even impedes the ability of states to institute 
superior schemes for dealing with cities that have gone broke.”). 
 46.  Moringiello, supra note 20, at 410. 
 47.  See Kimhi supra note 20, at 365 (explaining that Chapter IX’s primary purpose 
was overcoming the holdout problem). 
 48.  See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (describing the Contracts 
Clause and the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy law stating “the natural and 
reasonable remedy through composition of the debts of the district was not available under 
state law by reason of the restriction imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the 
impairment of contracts by state legislation.”) and Ashton v. Cameron County Water 
Improvement Dist. No. 1., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (“The Constitution was careful to 
provide that ‘no State shall . . .  pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’ 
This she may not do under the form of a bankruptcy act or otherwise. Nor do we think she 
can accomplish the same end by granting any permission necessary to enable Congress so to 
do.”) (internal citations omitted). But see Whitney Cloud, Comment, State Pension Deficits, 
the Recession, and A Modern View of the Contracts Clause, 120 YALE L. J. 2199 (2011) 
(arguing that the recent financial crisis provides a justification for impairing public 
employment contracts). 
 49.  See Revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 302, § 83(a), 50 Stat. 653, 655 
(1937) (“The petition shall state that a plan of composition has been prepared, is filed and 
submitted with the petition, and that creditors of the petitioner owning not less than 51 per 
centum in amount of the securities affected by the plan . . . have accepted it in writing.”). 
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a debtor to use bankruptcy for any broader purpose than to adjust a single 
type of indebtedness.
50
 
Despite the limited focus of the original Chapter IX, the Supreme 
Court found it to be unconstitutional as it threatened to interfere with local 
fiscal affairs, thus exceeding the scope of Congress’s constitutional 
powers.
51
  The Court reversed course two years in upholding a (slightly) 
revised municipal bankruptcy law, holding that, to the extent the federal 
law encroaches on municipal fiscal affairs, it does so only at the request of 
the states themselves.
52
 
Following the Revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937, Congress 
expanded the powers available to a debtor under Chapter IX and eased the 
entry requirement by getting rid of the requirement that the municipality 
have a pre-approved plan.
53
  But even in doing so, Chapter 9 remained 
focused on debt adjustment and carefully circumscribed the law to prevent 
federal intrusion into municipal governance.
54
  The legislative history to the 
1976 revisions to Chapter IX explains that the changes did not expand the 
scope of the law: 
 
Chapter IX provides essentially for Federal court supervision of a 
settlement between the petitioner municipality and a majority of 
its creditors.  A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to 
satisfy its creditors totally and finally.  Therefore, the primary 
purpose of a Chapter IX is to allow the municipal unit to continue 
operating while it adjusts or refinances creditor claims with 
minimum (and in many cases, no) loss to its creditors.
55
 
 
Two years later when Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws with 
 
 50.  Such pre-approved (or “pre-packaged” filings) are permitted under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, and as commenters have noted, such pre-packaged filings almost 
necessarily handle just one layer of the capital structure.  See Marc S. Kirschner, Dan A. 
Kusnetz Laurence Y. Solarsh, Craig S. Gatarz, Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The 
Deleveraging Tool of the ‘90s in the Wake of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 643, 661 (1991) (“As a practical matter, the pre-packaged bankruptcy unfolds in a 
manner similar to an out-of-court exchange offer: there is a negotiation with major 
bondholders, the preparation of offering literature (a combination exchange offer and 
disclosure statement) and the negotiation of a plan.”). 
 51.  Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 532 
(1936). 
 52.  Bekins, 304 U.S. at 27. 
 53.  Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (1976).  Following New York City’s financial 
crisis in the early 1970s, Congress expanded Chapter IX in order to make it more workable 
for large cities. 
 54.  Moringiello, supra note 20, at 455. 
 55.  H. R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 6 (1975). 
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the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress created Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code with only technical changes to the old Chapter 9.
56
  
Chapter 9 incorporates many of its provisions from Chapter 11, the new 
corporate reorganization chapter, thus linking the two chapters together.
57
 
Because a significant portion of Chapter 9 includes provisions 
incorporated from Chapter 11, some have argued that Congress intended 
municipal bankruptcy to be more or less similar to corporate 
reorganizations.
58
  Omer Kimhi has described Chapter 9 as “a corporate 
bankruptcy procedure mutatis mutandis.”
59
 
The legislative history, though, clearly reflects an understanding that, 
despite their procedural similarities, Chapter 9 is significantly different in 
scope and purpose than Chapter 11: 
 
The general policy underlying the municipal debt adjustments 
chapter is the same as that underlying the [business] 
reorganization chapter.  The Chapter gives the debtor a breathing 
spell from debt collection efforts in order that it can work out a 
repayment plan with its creditors. There are two major 
differences from general reorganization law: first, the law must 
be sensitive to the issue of the sovereignty of the States; second, a 
municipality is generally not a business enterprise operating for 
profit, and there are no stockholders.  These differences dictate 
some limitations on the court’s powers in dealing with a 
municipal debt adjustment, and some modifications of the 
standards governing the proposal and confirmation of a plan.
60
 
 
The narrow scope of Chapter 9 – with its focus on confirming a debt 
readjustment plan – and its conscious effort to limit federal intrusion in to 
municipal governance reflect these concerns about state sovereignty.  They 
also reflect the narrower policy of Chapter 9.  Whereas Chapter 11 serves 
the dual, and at times conflicting, policies of maximizing returns to 
creditors and facilitating the debtor’s reorganization,
61
 the legislative 
history emphasizes that “the primary purpose of Chapter 9 is to allow the 
municipal unit to continue operating while it adjusts or refinances creditor 
 
 56.  Kimhi, supra note 20, at 368-69. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 369 (“Indeed, Congress’s underlying assumption was that the two chapters 
are more or less the same.”). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 263 (1977). 
 61.  See Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate 
Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 476 (2011) (rehabilitating corporate debtors 
and maximizing recoveries to creditors are the primary goals of Chapter 11). 
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claims with minimum (and in many cases, no) loss to its creditors.”
62
 
II. FUNCTION OF THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION RULE 
The unfair discrimination rule is an element of the “cram down” 
requirements that must be met before a court can confirm a non-consensual 
debt adjustment plan.  These requirements are found in Section 1129(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code and are, thus, applicable in Chapter 11 cases.  Section 
901 makes these requirements applicable in municipal bankruptcy as well.  
These requirements state that, in order for a court to confirm a debt 
adjustment plan over the objection of a class of creditors, the court must 
find that “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, 
with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and 
has not accepted, the plan.”
63
 
While these rules apply only in the event that there is a dissenting 
class of creditors, they shape the plan negotiation process by providing a 
background set of rules applicable in the event the debtor cannot achieve 
consensual support for its plan.  As Kenneth Klee, one of the drafters of the 
Bankruptcy Code, explained shortly after the new law was enacted, even 
though the cram down rules apply only if a class dissents, “one of the 
hypotheses of the Code is that the rule will also affect the negotiating 
posture of the debtors and creditors with respect to formulation of a plan.”
64
  
Melissa Jacoby has made this point specifically about the Detroit plan 
confirmation process, explaining that “[t]he strength of the cramdown-
related arguments contribute to the leverage of the parties to compromise 
and settle.”
65
 
These requirements impose a limit on a debtor’s freedom in allocating 
value under a debt adjustment plan.
66
 In both Chapters 9 and 11, the 
Bankruptcy Code provides a baseline distributional requirement that the 
plan be in the best interests of creditors.
67
  In Chapter 11, this means that 
the creditors must receive as much under the plan as they would have 
received under a Chapter 7 liquidation.
68
  In Chapter 9, it has been 
 
 62.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 263. 
 63.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2010). 
 64.  Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New 
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 134 (1979). 
 65.  Melissa Jacoby, Q & A on C of D, CREDIT SLIPS (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/06/q-a-on-c-of-d.html. 
 66.  See Pryor, supra note 9, at 85-86 (noting that the “fair and equitable” and unfair 
discrimination rule limit the plan’s freedom in allocating risk). 
 67.  Id. (identifying the best interests requirement as a third limitation on risk 
allocation). 
 68.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2010). 
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suggested that this requirement means that creditors must receive at least as 
much as they would have received under state collection laws, generally 
under a mandamus action.
69
  A debtor has freedom to allocate any value 
above this baseline – the “reorganization surplus” – but that freedom is 
constrained by the creditors’ right to oppose the debtor’s plan.  The court 
may confirm a plan over the objections of dissenting creditors only if it 
finds that the plan is (1) fair and equitable and (2) does not discriminate 
unfairly as to those dissenting creditors. 
These two rules – the unfair discrimination rule and the fair and 
equitable rule – thus enable a court to confirm a plan even over the 
objection of a class of creditors but only if the court finds that their 
interests were protected.  As discussed in the following section, these two 
rules were conflated at one point, but they have developed into two free-
standing tests. 
A. Development of Unfair Discrimination Rule 
Historically, the fair and equitable rule and the unfair discrimination 
rule were conflated, with the fair and equitable rule serving as a broad set 
of principles that included that of unfair discrimination.
70
  Both rules 
derived from principles developed in the equity receivership cases of the 
1900s.
71
  During that time, there was no reorganization procedure for 
corporations.  Instead, corporate debtors sought to reorganize through an 
equity receivership.  Under this receivership procedure, a corporation or 
railroad attempting to reorganize its debts could do so through a voluntary 
workout or, barring that, through a legal device called an equity 
receivership.
72
  An unsecured creditor could petition a court to appoint a 
receiver to take control of the railroad’s assets.  At the foreclosure sale, a 
committee of old creditors would then “purchase” the railroad through a 
credit bid – that is, not by contributing new cash but by bidding with the 
face value of their notes.  As Stephen Lubben notes, “[o]ne of the most 
controversial features of receiverships was the frequency with which 
 
 69.  See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers 
eds., 16th ed.) (“The concept should be interpreted to mean that the plan must be better than 
the alternative that creditors have. In the chapter 9 context, the alternative is dismissal of the 
case, permitting every creditor to fend for itself in the race to obtain the mandamus remedy 
and to collect the proceeds.”). 
 70.  See Markell, supra note 17, at 232-33 (1998) (discussing how Congress, courts, 
and commentators treated the fair and equitable rule as including the unfair discrimination 
rule). 
 71.  Id. at 228-31. 
 72.  Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1445 (2004).  
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existing shareholders were able to maintain their position in the 
reorganized railroad, despite the failure to pay creditors in full.”
73
 
In response to these concerns, the equity receivership courts created 
equitable protections for these unsecured creditors who got squeezed out 
between the secured creditors and the old shareholders, which protections 
were broadly cabined under the requirement that the plan be “fair and 
equitable.”
74
  Courts would variously refer to these protections as 
embodying basic principles of debt compositions that shareholders could 
not be paid before dissenting creditors and that creditors should be treated 
equally.
75
 
When drafting the first municipal, corporate, and railroad bankruptcy 
provisions in the 1930s, Congress required that the debt composition plan 
be approved by creditors and that the court be satisfied that the plan “is fair, 
equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors, and does not 
discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors”.
76
 
Congress revised the business bankruptcy provisions shortly thereafter 
in the Chandler Act and removed the unfair discrimination language, 
leaving only the requirement that the plan be “fair and equitable.”
77
  The 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 
972 (1989) (characterizing that decision as prohibiting the “old bondholders and 
stockholders” from “‘squeezing out’ the intermediate unsecured debt”). 
 75.  See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) 
(commenting on the discrepancy between shareholders and creditors suggesting that 
equality should be attained) and Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) 
(same); see also Bruce Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 78-90 (1991) (exploring the relationship between the 
absolute priority rule and new value principles by examining the historical origins). 
 76.  Pub. L. No. 251, § 80(e), 48 Stat. 798, 801 (1934). The Supreme Court found this 
law to be unconstitutional in 1936, after which Congress passed a Revised Municipal 
Bankruptcy Act in 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937), which was nearly identical.  
It kept the unfair discrimination rule, stating that the court shall confirm the plan “if satisfied 
that (1) it is fair, equitable and for the best interests of the creditors and does not 
discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors.” § 83(e), 50 Stat. at 658 
(emphasis added to highlight the changed language). The railroad amendments required the 
judge to find that the plan “is fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors, and 
does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors.” Pub. L. No. 74-381, § 
77(e), 49 Stat. 911, 918 (1935). The corporate amendments required the judge to find that 
the plan “(1) it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class 
of creditors or stockholders, and is feasible.” Pub. L. No. 73-296, § 77B(f), 48 Stat. 911, 919 
(1934) 
 77.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1938, commonly known as the Chandler Act, required that 
the plan be “fair and equitable.” Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 221, 52 Stat. 840, 897 (1938); see 
Markell, supra at note 17, at 232. (“Each of these revisions omitted the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination, inserting in its place a requirement that ‘the plan [be] fair and equitable, and 
feasible.’”). 
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legislative history explains that Congress did not intend to remove the 
unfair discrimination protection; rather, Congress viewed this protection as 
inherent within the broader “fair and equitable” requirement, thus making 
redundant to include the unfair discrimination language.
78
 
Congress subsequently removed the “fair and equitable” language 
altogether from business bankruptcies under Chapter XI (which applied to 
smaller businesses, at least in theory).
79
  The justification for this removal 
was that these creditor protections were not needed in these smaller 
business bankruptcies. 
Both the fair and equitable rule and unfair discrimination rules, 
however, remained in the municipal bankruptcy laws under Chapter IX.  As 
discussed infra in Part III.A, the Supreme Court recognized that the unfair 
discrimination rule was a subset of the broader fair and equitable principles 
developed in those old equity receivership cases and early bankruptcy 
cases. 
When Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws in the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, it re-introduced both the unfair discrimination and fair 
and equitable rules in the cram down procedures for Chapters 9 and 11.
80
  It 
did so directly in Chapter 11 in Section 1129(b), and it amended Chapter 9 
to incorporate the Chapter 11 requirements. 
B. Vertical vs. Horizontal Protections 
The legislative history clearly contemplates these two rules as serving 
different functions, although the history is not very helpful in interpreting 
the exact parameter of these functions.
81
  Bruce Markell, in one of the most 
influential articles on the unfair discrimination rule, has characterized these 
functions as providing both vertical and horizontal limits on a debtor’s 
freedom to allocate the reorganization surplus: 
 
Just as the fair and equitable requirement regulates priority 
among classes of creditors having higher and lower priorities, 
creating inter-priority fairness, so the unfair discrimination 
provision promotes intra-priority fairness, assuring equitable 
 
 78.  S. REP. NO. 75-1916, at 35-36 (1938) (Senate Report No. 1916 accompanied H.R. 
8046, which was the bill ultimately enacted) (“a prohibition against any unfair 
discrimination in the plan in favor of any creditors or stock-holders and the express 
statement to that effect in Section 77B is therefore unnecessary.”). 
 79.  KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT  390 n.2083 (2009). 
 80.  Pub. L. No. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
 81.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 416-17 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6373. 
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treatment among creditors who have the same level of priority.
82
 
 
Although the absolute priority rule and the unfair discrimination rule 
impose different types of limitation, they both serve the same function of 
placing a limit on how a plan can allocate value among classes of creditors.  
These limitations can only be invoked by a dissenting class of creditors – 
thus, there must be such a dissenting class; however, they cast a shadow 
over the plan negotiation process.
83
  These rules create the legal backdrop 
against which plan negotiations take place, thus shaping the parties’ 
negotiation positions even prior to a vote on the plan. 
Most case law and scholarship has focused on the vertical limits of the 
fair and equitable rule, as a frequent issue is whether a debtor should be 
able to allocate value to old stockholders even when it has not paid its 
creditors in full.
84
  Congress clarified that the fair and equitable rule 
includes the so-called absolute priority rule, which requires that dissenting 
senior claimants be paid in full before the plan distributes any value to 
junior claimants.
85
  The cases and scholarship on this rule – while diverging 
on how it should be applied— all recognize that it functions to limit a 
debtor’s freedom to allocate the reorganization surplus, i.e., the value in 
excess of the debtor’s liquidation value.
86
 
Whereas the fair and equitable rule’s vertical limitation plays a 
significant role in shaping plan negotiations in the Chapter 11 context, it is 
less likely to do so in the Chapter 9 context.
87
  There are no shareholders in 
this context, and so the traditional fight between the creditors and the 
shareholders is simply not present.  This is not to say that the fair and 
equitable rule has no meaning in this context, as that rule is broader than 
just the absolute priority rule.
88
  But the lack of shareholders eliminates a 
 
 82.  Markell, supra at note 17, at 228. 
 83.  Klee, supra note 64 and accompanying text; Jacoby, supra note 65 and 
accompanying text. 
 84.  Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9 at 630 (“Most prior 
writing on municipal bankruptcy has focused on the test of vertical equity.”). 
 85.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). 
 86.  See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 585 
(1998) (explaining that the only debatable issue relates to adding new value to the company 
to overcome the creditors’ objections).  
 87.  See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial 
Distress, 88 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 633, 652 (2008) (considering the limited applicability of 
the absolute priority rule in protecting the interests of unsecured creditors). 
 88.  See Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable 
Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 31, 33 (2012) (discussing the application of the fair and equitable rule in the context of 
non-profit corporations which likewise have no shareholders: “Simply because Chapter 11 
does not contemplate nonprofits’ unique structures and operational goals does not mean that 
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common source of disputes under the fair and equitable rule. Further, the 
fair and equitable rule’s vertical protection is generally less applicable as 
municipal bankruptcy has less “verticality” to protect, as the priority 
structure is flatter in the municipal context, as there are no statutory 
priorities. 
In this flatter priority structure, the unfair discrimination role is likely 
to play a significant role in limiting the debtor’s ability to allocate the 
reorganization surplus in Chapter 9.  This is particularly so if municipal 
debtors seek to use bankruptcy to impair pensions obligations, as has 
happened in Detroit and Stockton, California.  This is so because, even 
though their claims arise from different sources, pension and bond claims 
occupy the same priority level.  Accordingly, the unfair discrimination rule 
will shape a municipal debtor’s negotiations in crafting a plan that will 
allocate more (or less) value to pensioners relative to bondholders and other 
unsecured creditors.
89
 
A brief description of Detroit’s plan of adjustment here serves to 
illustrate the unfair discrimination rule’s impact in a municipal bankruptcy 
plan that proposes to impair public pensions. 
C. Detroit 
This section will describe Detroit’s negotiations with its unsecured 
creditors, principally its pension claimants and bondholders.  The 
negotiations and ultimate resolution highlight the role of the unfair 
discrimination rule.  As both pensioners and bondholders have claims of 
the same legal status, the unfair discrimination rule provided the legal 
framework for negotiations among these claimants, as the rule would apply 
if any class voted against the plan. 
The cornerstone of these negotiations is a settlement that combines the 
two most controversial aspects of the case: the treatment of pensioners and 
the treatment of Detroit’s world-class art collection at the Detroit Institute 
of Arts (DIA).  This settlement has been called the Grand Bargain.
90
 
The Grand Bargain is a multiparty settlement involving the state of 
 
the guiding policies behind the requirements of Chapter 11 should not apply with the same 
force and intention to nonprofits. In an effort to bring courts one step closer to applying the 
same rigorous approval criteria to nonprofits’ reorganization plans, this Article focuses on 
one crucial aspect of courts’ evaluation of plans—the fair and equitable standard.”). 
 89.  See Skeel, supra note 9, at 19 (noting that the unfair discrimination rule “may 
prove extremely important in a case like Detroit – much more important than commentators 
have recognized thus far.”). 
 90.  David A. Skeel, From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit 15 (Univ. of Penn. 
Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Paper No. 1420, 2014), available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1420. 
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Michigan, a consortium of private institutions, the DIA, and Detroit’s 
pensioners.  It contemplates four major moves: (1) the City will transfer the 
DIA assets to a public trust that will keep the artwork in Detroit in 
perpetuity;
91
 (2) the DIA and private institutions (such as the Kellogg 
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, General Motors, the United 
Autoworkers) will contribute no less than $466 million over 20 years to 
fund the pensions;
92
 (3) the state of Michigan will likewise contribute the 
net present value of $350 million over 20 years to fund the pensions
93
; and 
(4) the pensioners will drop their objections and appeals and support the 
plan.
94
 
The foundations and the DIA successfully raised the requisite funds; 
the Michigan legislature approved a bill that will send a one-time $194.8 
million to the pensions;
95
 and the retiree committee endorsed the plan.
96
  
The remaining question leading up to Detroit’s trial on plan confirmation 
was whether, if the bondholders opposed the plan, the court would find that 
the plan unfairly discriminated in favor of the pensioners. 
The question, then, was whether this arrangement could be confirmed 
without the consent of the bondholders, who were cut out of this Grand 
Bargain.  The bondholders argued that the City could get more money from 
an auction of the DIA assets – enough that might actually fully fund the 
pensions and pay the bondholders.
97
 
Without the consent of the bondholder class of creditors, the plan 
could be confirmed only under the “cram down” provisions of Section 
1129(b), which require the court to find that the plan is fair and equitable 
and does not unfairly discriminate as to the class of bondholders.
98
 
 
 91.  Fifth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit at 51, In re 
City of Detroit Bankr., No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 25, 2014) [hereinafter Fifth 
Amended Plan] (“Transfer of DIA Assets. On the Effective Date, the City shall irrevocably 
transfer the DIA Assets to DIA Corp., as trustee, to be held in perpetual charitable trust, and 
within the City limits, for the primary benefit of the residents of the City and the Counties 
and the citizens of the State.”) 
 92.  Id. This includes $366 million from the foundations and an additional $100 million 
from the DIA.  The foundations are listed in Exhibit B to the Disclosure Statement. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 50-51. 
 95.  Kathleen Gray, Michigan Senate OKs historic $195M Detroit aid package; 
Snyder’s signature next, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 4, 2014), http://www.freep.com/ 
article/20140603/NEWS06/306030043/Detroit-bankruptcy-pensions-artwork. 
 96.  Karen Pierog, Detroit Retiree Committee Reaches Deal on Pensions, Healthcare, 
REUTERS (April 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/26/usa-detroit-
bankruptcy-idUSL2N0NI01920140426. 
 97.  Steven Church, Detroit Bond Insurer Syncora Calls 75% Debt Recovery Fair, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-03/syncora-
seeks-75-debt-repayment-in-detroit-restructuring.html. 
 98.  11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2010).  The court must also find that the plan is feasible and in 
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Leading up to the confirmation hearing, Detroit reached settlements 
with the two main bond insurers, increasing the distributions to those 
insurers in exchange for their support of the plan.  Two “catch all” classes 
of unsecured creditors continued to oppose the plan, however.  The first 
was the “convenience class”
99
 – that is, those with small claims – and the 
second included individual plaintiffs with claims against the city for 
injuries such as tort and civil rights damages.
100
 
III. THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION RULE’S MEANING 
The prior section described the function of the unfair discrimination 
rule in limiting a municipal debtor’s allocation of the reorganization value.  
It concluded by considering the role of unfair discrimination in the 
confirmation of Detroit’s plan of adjustment.  This section will discuss how 
courts have interpreted this rule. 
There has been no case law interpreting this rule under Chapter 9, so 
this section will begin in Part III.A with a historical analysis of this rule 
under the prior municipal bankruptcy law under Chapter IX of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  Although the unfair discrimination rule served a 
slightly different procedural rule under Chapter IX, the case law under 
Chapter IX provides some guidance as to the meaning of the unfair 
discrimination rule. 
Part III.B will then discuss the Chapter 11 case law interpreting the 
unfair discrimination rule.  Chapter 9 directly incorporates the unfair 
discrimination rule from Chapter 11, and as discussed in Part III.A, the rule 
in both chapters draws from the same historical roots. 
A. Chapter IX: Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation 
As discussed above, Chapter IX was originally devised for the narrow 
purpose of giving municipalities a tool to solve the dissenting creditor 
holdout problem.
101
  Similar to modern bankruptcy law, the old Chapter IX 
provided two ways that the debtor could solve this holdout problem.  The 
first was through supermajority voting: the plan could be confirmed with 
 
the best interests of all creditors, neither of which is a foregone conclusion.  But the unfair 
discrimination part is likely to play the largest role both in continued negotiations with the 
bondholders and in any litigation concerning the plan. 
 99.  Fifth Amended Plan, supra note 91, at 6, ¶ 65 (defining “convenience claim” as 
consisting of any “other unsecured claim” for $25,000 or less). 
 100.   Id. at 18, ¶ 224 (defining “Other Unsecured Claim” as a catch all category that 
includes “Section 1983 claims, Indirect Employee Indemnity Claims and Indirect 36th 
District Court Claims”). 
 101.  Supra Part I.B and text accompanying notes 45 & 46. 
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the approval of creditors holding two thirds in amount of the claims in each 
class.
102
  Alternatively, if there was a dissenting class, the debtor could 
confirm the plan “if provision is made in the plan for the protection of the 
interests, claims, or liens of such creditors or class of creditors.”
103
  So just 
as in modern bankruptcy law, there was supermajority voting within classes 
and a cram down procedure applicable when there was a dissenting class. 
Whereas the unfair discrimination rule today is part of the cram down 
rules, under Chapter IX the unfair discrimination rule could be raised even 
if the plan were accepted by all classes.
104
  As originally enacted in 1934, 
Chapter IX required that a court find that “the plan is fair, equitable, and 
for the best interests of the creditors, and does not discriminate unfairly in 
favor of any class of creditors.”
105
  After the Supreme Court found this law 
to be unconstitutional in Ashton
106
, Congress passed a Revised Municipal 
Bankruptcy Act in 1937, which required that again that the plan be fair and 
equitable and in the best interests of the creditors, but this time said that the 
plan “does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of 
creditors.”
107
 
Thus, whereas the modern unfair discrimination rule serves an inter-
class protection within each level of priority, the Chapter IX rule also 
applied intra-class, as it could be raised by the dissenting creditors within 
any class.  The two Supreme Court cases infra discussing the rule under 
Chapter IX both involve such intra-class disputes. 
1. Avon Park, Florida 
In 1940 the Supreme Court considered whether Avon Park, Florida, 
had unfairly discriminated against bondholders in its plan of adjustment 
under Chapter IX.
108
  Avon Park had hired an agent, R.E. Crummer & Co., 
to negotiate the plan of adjustment (remember, at that time municipalities 
had to have a pre-approved plan of adjustment in order to file 
 
 102.  Bankruptcy Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 251, § 80(d), 48 Stat. 798, 801 (1934) , 
invalidated by Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 
(1936). 
 103.  Id. § 80(d) 
 104.  Id. § 80(e) (requiring the judge to find that the plan satisfies the unfair 
discrimination and fair and equitable rules, and that it “has been accepted and approved as 
required by the provisions of subdivision (d) of this chapter.”). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 107.  Revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 302, § 83(e), 50 Stat. 653, 658 
(1937) (emphasis added). 
 108.  Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 141 
(1940).  Chapter IX was the precursor to current Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Under 
Chapter IX, the plan of adjustment was referred to as a “plan of composition.” 
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bankruptcy).
109
  The City was to pay Crummer for these services by 
assessing charges against the participating bondholders.
110
  Crummer went 
about soliciting assents from bondholders but, in order to meet the requisite 
two-thirds approval, bought claims from dissenting bondholders.
111
 
The City placed all the bonds in the same class, giving them equal 
treatment within the class.
112
  The requisite supermajority approved the 
plan, but one of the dissenting bondholders objected to the plan.  The 
dissenting creditor argued, inter alia, that the plan violated the unfair 
discrimination rule because Crummer was receiving more under the plan 
than the other bondholders, as Crummer was to receive payment for its 
services on top of the class-wide distribution.
113
 
The Court agreed that this amounted to unfair discrimination.
114
  It 
explained that unfair discrimination rule reflects the principle of “equality 
of treatment of creditors,” a rule drawn from “the old § 12.”
115
  It explained 
that under that previous law and its antecedents, “a composition would not 
be confirmed where one creditor was obtaining some special favor or 
inducement not accorded the others, whether that consideration moved 
from the debtor or from another.”
116
  The Court cited early 1900s business 
cases to support that principle, and then said “[t]hat principle has been 
imbedded by Congress in Chapter IX by the express provision against 
unfair discrimination.”
117
 
The Court went on to note that the preferred treatment given to 
Crummer might be appropriate if the debtor could establish that Crummer’s 
benefit reflected the reasonable value of its services.
118
  The Court appears 
to be relying on the Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, Co. for this 
principle, citing this case a few sentences later.
119
 
Los Angeles Lumber is known as one of the foundational cases 
establishing the “new value rule” (or “new value corollary”).
120
 Los Angeles 
 
 109.  Id. at 141-42. 
 110.  Id. at 141. 
 111.  Id. at 142.  Although the court did not specifically find that this was the purpose of 
Crummer’s claim purchases, it said that, “the inference seems clear that some of them were 
acquired in order to facilitate consummation of the composition by placing them in friendly 
hands.”  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 142-43. 
 113.  Id. at 143.  
 114.  Id. at 147-48. 
 115.  Id. at 147. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 148. 
 119.  Id. (citing Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. 106 (1939)). 
 120.   Michelle Craig, Note, The New Value Exception:  A Plea for Modification or 
Elimination, 11 Bankr. Dev. J. 781, 781 & n.2 (1995) (citing Los Angeles Lumber and 
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Lumber did not involve the unfair discrimination rule; rather it involved the 
absolute priority rule, as the plan proposed to distribute value to the old 
stockholders even though creditors would not be repaid in full.
121
 The Court 
found the plan to be not fair and equitable because it departed from the 
absolute priority rule.
122
  But the Court said that such a departure may be 
permitted if in exchange for a new value contribution.
123
 
Avon Park suggests that this same “new value” principle would apply 
in the unfair discrimination context, a suggestion that the Court further 
explored in Mason v. Paradise Irrigation District, below. 
2. Paradise Irrigation District 
In another case penned by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court again 
reviewed a plan of adjustment under Chapter IX to determine if it unfairly 
discriminated among bondholders within the same class.
124
  In that case, 
Paradise Irrigation District in California sought to re-negotiate its bonds 
with the aid of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
125
  The RFC lent 
$252,500 to the irrigation district, to be used to redeem its bonds at a 
roughly 50% discount.
126
  In exchange, the irrigation district was to issue 
new 4 per cent bonds to the RFC.
127
 
The RFC, applying its loan, then purchased claims representing 
approximately 92% of the principal amount of the bond debt, but the 
remaining 8% held out.
128
  Paradise was then forced to file for relief under 
Chapter IX, offering to pay the holdouts the same 50% value as the 
assenting bondholders had received from the RFC.
129
  RFC, which had 
purchased the bonds of the assenting creditors, was thus receiving 4 percent 
refunding bonds while the holdouts were to receive 50 cents on the dollar.  
One of the holdouts argued this constituted unfair discrimination. 
The Court held that this was not unfair discrimination because the 
RFC had not “by purchasing bonds in the market acquired merely a 
 
noting that “the United States Supreme Court established the “new value exception” to the 
absolute priority rule). 
 121.  Case v. Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. 106, 111 (1939). 
 122.  Id. at 119. 
 123.  Id. at 121. 
 124.  Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 538 (1946). 
 125.  The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was a Depression Era independent 
government agency created under the 1932 Finance Reconstruction Act in order “to provide 
emergency financing facilities for financial institutions to aid in financing agriculture, 
commerce, and industry and for other purposes.” H.R. REP. NO. 72-243 (1932). 
 126.  Mason, 326 U.S. at 539. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 539-40. 
 129.  Id. 
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speculative position in the plan of composition” but “has underwritten the 
whole refinancing program.”
130
  It had thus provided value to the 
bankruptcy proceeding, and the Court again cited Case v. Los Angeles 
Lumber for the proposition that, “[i]t has long been recognized in 
reorganization law that those who put new money into the distressed 
enterprise may be given a participation in the reorganization plan 
reasonably equivalent to their contribution.”
131
  That is, again drawing from 
business bankruptcy cases, it held that the new value exception applies to 
unfair discrimination, explaining how, “That rule is based on practical 
necessities. Without the inducement new money could not be obtained.”
132
 
3. Analysis: Equitable Principles 
Although there have been significant changes in municipal bankruptcy 
law since Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation, these cases provide two 
important points in interpreting and applying the unfair discrimination rule. 
The first is that the unfair discrimination rule embodies part of the old 
equitable principles developed in the early 1900s to protect creditors.  One 
is that of equality among creditors.  The other is that a bankruptcy plan may 
distribute greater value to those creditors that have contributed new value 
to the reorganization effort. 
The principle of equality among creditors can best be understood as 
stating the aspiration that equally situated creditors will receive equal 
treatment.  It should not be read as a requirement that a plan provide 
exactly equal treatment to all similarly situated creditors.
133
  Where 
Congress intended such a rule, it has explicitly said so.  For example, the 
Bankruptcy Code requires that all creditors placed within the same class 
receive equal treatment.
134
  In contrast, the unfair discrimination rule 
presumes that some discrimination is appropriate.  As Skeel states, “No 
unfair discrimination is not the same thing as no discrimination.”
135
  The 
principle of equality among creditors does not elucidate when 
discrimination crosses the line into unfair discrimination. 
The new value principle in these cases may be interpreted either as an 
exception to the unfair discrimination rule or as a separate factor to be 
considered under the “fair and equitable” principles.  The general premises 
 
 130.  Id. at 541. 
 131.  Id. at 541-42. 
 132.  Mason, 326 U.S. at 542.  
 133.  But see infra note  143 (noting that a few outlier cases have indeed read the unfair 
discrimination rule so narrowly as to say that any material discrimination is per se unfair). 
 134.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(4), 1322(a)(3). 
 135.  Skeel, supra note 9, at 19. 
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of the rule – that parties which contribute to the reorganization effort 
should get special treatment – is reflected in various portions of the modern 
Bankruptcy Code.  For example, a court may award statutory administrator 
priority (thus, effectively guaranteeing payment in full) to those expenses 
incurred by the bankruptcy that represent “the actual, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving the estate”.
136
  These may include the professional 
fees incurred in administering the case.
137
  In fact, if Avon Park or Paradise 
Irrigation were brought under current law, they most likely would be 
litigated not under the unfair discrimination rule but on a determination of 
whether the expenses paid to the favored party reflected the necessary costs 
of effectuating the plan. 
The second broad principle to be derived from these cases is that the 
unfair discrimination rule in Chapter IX has long been understood as 
arising from the same historical origins as under corporate reorganization 
law.  Both Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation cite old equity receivership 
cases as well as corporate bankruptcy cases, showing that the rule in both 
contexts draws from the old “fair and equitable” principles first developed 
in the equity receivership cases.  Thus, modern Chapter 9’s direct 
incorporation of portions of Chapter 11 is fully consistent with the way 
municipal bankruptcy law historically overlapped with business bankruptcy 
law. 
B. Chapter 11 Case Law 
Because Congress incorporated Chapter 11’s unfair discrimination 
rule into Chapter 9, this section of the article will explore how courts have 
interpreted this rule under Chapter 11.  Although perhaps the Chapter 11 
case law interpreting the unfair discrimination rule should not be 
controlling in Chapter 9 cases – an argument discussed and ultimately 
dismissed infra in Part IV – for this part of the article it is at least 
instructive to look at the Chapter 11 interpretation of the unfair 
discrimination. 
When Congress added the unfair discrimination rule in section 1129 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, this marked the first time in 
roughly 40 years that the unfair discrimination rule had been applicable in 
corporate bankruptcy.  Congress had included the unfair discrimination rule 
in the very first corporate bankruptcy law in 1934, but it subsequently 
removed this rule a few years later.
138
  So when Congress re-introduced the 
unfair discrimination rule in creating Chapter 11 in 1978, there was not 
 
 136.  11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2005). 
 137.  11 U.S.C. § 328 (2005). 
 138.  See supra Part II. 
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much prior case law to guide its application in Chapter 11.  The legislative 
history of this rule provided little guidance, offering the unhelpful 
statement that “[t]he criterion of unfair discrimination is not derived from 
the fair and equitable rule or from the best interests of creditors test.”
139
  As 
Markell remarks, “This statement must be seen as odd, given Congress’ 
remarks regarding municipal arrangements just two years earlier, in which 
unfair discrimination was said to be a derivative of the fair and equitable 
principle.”
140
  The House Report goes on to provide examples of unfair 
discrimination in the situation of contractual subordination agreements, but 
the main point seems to be merely that the equally situated classes should 
receive equal treatment – a statement that provides no help in determining 
when discrimination reaches the point of unfairness.
141
 
Because there was not extensive Chapter XI case law from which to 
draw, courts looked to case law interpreting the “unfair discrimination” 
language contained in Chapter 13’s consumer debt composition rules, 
developing what has been called the Four Factor Test, discussed in detail 
below.  This test was criticized by many courts as being unworkable, 
leading to the development of an alternative test has been widely adopted, 
based on an influential law review article by Bruce Markell.
142
  This test 
finds a rebuttable presumption of unfair discrimination whenever a 
dissenting class receives materially different treatment from a similarly 
situated class – a test sometimes referred to as the presumption-based 
approach or the Markell Test.  Each of these two tests is discussed in order 
below.
143
 
 
 139. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 417 (1977). 
 140. Markell, supra note 17, at 236.  
 141. Supra note 139, at 416-17. 
 142.  Markell, supra note 17, at 242. Courts that have accepted Markell’s test include: In 
re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 122 (D. Del. 2006); In re Quay Corp., Inc., 
372 B.R. 378, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Sentry Operating Co. of Texas, Inc., 264 
B.R. 850, 863 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2001); In re Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 
213, 231-32 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 702 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 1999). 
 143.  It should be noted there are two other ways some courts have interpreted the unfair 
discrimination rule, but they are outlier approaches.  A few courts have simply applied a 
bright-line rule that any discrimination at all is per se unfair discrimination.  See G. Eric 
Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Unresolved Doctrines of 
Classification and Unfair Discrimination, 55 BUS. LAWYER 1, 47 (1999) (citing In re 
Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 571 n.16 (Bankr. W.D.Tex. 1989)).  Others have 
said that, since the legislative history discussing this rule did so in the context of 
subordination agreements, the unfair discrimination rule only applies if there is an inter-
creditor subordination agreement.  See In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 
1986) (arguing that “the concept of unfair discrimination applies to plans in which claims or 
interests have been subordinated.”). But because these two rules both elevate the legislative 
history of the rule over its text, and because they both render the word “unfairly” 
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1. Chapter 13-Derived Four-Factor Test 
The Four-Factor Test is derived from Chapter 13 case law interpreting 
the classification rule that permits consumer debtors to separately classify 
certain unsecured claims provided there is no unfair discrimination.
144
  A 
brief description of the Chapter 13 rule, consequently, is helpful for 
understanding the Chapter 11 case law. 
Chapter 13 provides consumer debtors the option of entering a debt 
composition plan, which allocates the debtor’s disposable income among 
its unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis.  Under the old Chapter XIII, the 
debtor had to place all its unsecured creditors within the same class.
145
  
Debtors struggled to complete such plans under Chapter XIII, in part 
because of the practical reality that a debtor might be under pressure to pay 
more than a pro rata portion to certain debts, such as debts shared with a 
co-debtor or debts that were non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.
146
  Since 
Chapter XIII did not provide for separate treatment for co-debts, a debtor 
would have to make additional payments outside the plan, thereby 
jeopardizing the debtor’s ability to make all required payments under the 
plan.
147
 
In response to this concern, Congress permitted debtors under Chapter 
13 to “designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided under 
section 1122 of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any 
class so designated.”
148
  Congress later amended this to specifically address 
co-debts: “such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if 
an individual is liable on such consumer debt with the debtor differently 
than other unsecured claims.”
149
  The legislative history acknowledged that 
co-debtor claims are theoretically identical to other unsecured claims, but 
separate classification reflects the practical reality that a debtor will attempt 
 
meaningless, this section will set these two aside as outlier interpretations. 
 144.  Markell, supra note 17, at 242 (describing the four-part test developed from 
Chapter 13 cases). 
 145.  See In re Wolff, 22 B.R. 510, 514 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (ruling that “Section 646 
of the Bankruptcy Act governed plans under former Chapter XIII. While the plan could 
provide for secured creditors ‘severally,’ it required that unsecured creditors be provided for 
‘generally.’ See, § 646(1), (2) of the Bankruptcy Act as amended. This was read to mean 
that all unsecured creditors were entitled to equal treatment. Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed. 
Vol. 10, ¶ 28.02.”). 
 146.  S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 18 (1983) (noting that a rigid requirement that a Chapter 13 
debtor make equal payments to all unsecured creditors may undermine the plan’s 
feasibility). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (2010). 
 149.  Id. The co-debtor provision was added in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 316, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (1984).  
DAWSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2015  4:54 PM 
28 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
to make additional payments under co-debts.
150
  Allowing a debtor to make 
such payments under the plan makes it more likely that the debtor will in 
fact complete the plan.
151
  In contrast,”[a] result which emphasizes purity in 
classifying claims does so at the price of a realistic plan.  Neither debtors 
nor creditors benefit from such a right approach.”
152
 
Although “unfair discrimination” in Chapter 13 is a classification rule, 
i.e., it limits the debtor’s ability to create separate classes of unsecured 
claims, classification in Chapter 13 has purely distributive consequences.  
This is because under Chapter 13, the classes of creditors do not vote on the 
debtor’s proposed plan; rather, the classes exist as part of the proposed 
distribution framework.
153
  The debtor’s plan must propose distributions to 
be made to each class, and all members within the class are required to 
receive the same distribution.
154
  So the only way to give different treatment 
to a group of creditors in Chapter 13 is to separately classify them. 
Based on the policy that separate classification should be permitted in 
order to make it more feasible for the debtor to actually complete her 
payments under the composition plan, Chapter 13 courts developed the 
following four-factor test to determine whether separate classification 
amounted to unfair discrimination: 
 
whether the discrimination has a reasonable basis; 
whether the debtor can carry out a plan without the discrimination; 
whether the discrimination is proposed in good faith; and 
whether the degree of discrimination is directly related to the basis or    
rationale for the discrimination.
155
 
 
Faced with the question of whether a Chapter 11 plan unfairly 
discriminates against a dissenting class of creditors, courts borrowed this 
Chapter 13 classification rule.
156
  Some courts, though, have noted that the 
four factors are redundant, as discrimination without a reasonable basis 
would appear to be in bad faith.
157
  Further, the plan itself must be proposed 
 
 150.  8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,¶ 1322.05 (Allen N Resnick et al. eds., Lexis Nexis 
16th ed. 2014) (2014) (noting that “[a]lthough there may be no theoretical differences 
between co-debtor claims and others, there are important practical differences” that must be 
recognized) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 17-18 (1983)). 
 151.  S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 18 (1983). 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2010) (setting forth the requirements of plan confirmation). 
 154.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) (2010). 
 155.  In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669, 672 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 156.  In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 590 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989). 
    157.  In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 700-01 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) 
(“Although many courts have applied the four-factor test in chapter 11 cases to decide the 
unfair discrimination issue, some courts, finding its elements redundant, have pared it down 
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in good faith, and so the unfair discrimination rule is not necessary to 
monitor the bona fides of the plan.
158
  Thus, some courts have boiled these 
four factors down to two questions (1) is there a rational basis for the 
discrimination? and (2) is the discrimination necessary for the 
reorganization?
159
 
These two standards themselves are largely inter-related, as the 
necessity for the reorganization is itself a rational basis for the 
discrimination; that is, discrimination that is necessary for the 
reorganization per se has a rational basis.  Thus, courts applying this test 
have found that discrimination has a rational basis when it is necessary to 
fulfill the Bankruptcy Code’s best interests test,
160
 when the discrimination 
will protect an essential relationship with suppliers,
161
 and when 
discrimination in favor of vendors is necessary for the reorganization.
162
 
2. Markell Test 
In response to perceived theoretical and practical shortcomings of the 
Four-Factor Test, many courts have adopted an alternative test proposed by 
Bruce Markell in a highly influential law review article.
163
  Markell 
proposed a test that creates a rebuttable presumption of unfair 
discrimination whenever a plan treats a dissenting class of creditors 
materially differently than another class that shares the same distributional 
priority.
164
  The debtor can then rebut the presumption of unfair 
discrimination in two ways.  First, the debtor can “prov[e] that the 
difference in treatment is attributable to differences in the prepetition status 
of the creditors.”
165
  That is, the discrimination is not unfair if the lower 
value (or increased risk) is consistent with the nature of the creditors’ 
 
to one or two factors.”). 
 158.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2010). 
 159.  In re Dow Corning, supra note 157 at 701.. 
 160.  In re 203 N. LaSalle St.P’ship, 190 B.R. 567, 586 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) aff’d sub 
nom. Bank of Am., Illinois v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1996) aff’d 
sub nom. Matter of 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997) rev’d sub nom. 
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 119 S. 
Ct. 1411, 143 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1999). 
 161.  See AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff, 22 B.R. 510 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (showing 
separate classification for business debtor’s insurance company and material suppliers may 
be permitted if debtor can show they are essential for debtor to continue in business). 
 162.  In re Creekstone Apartments, 168 B.R. 639, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994) 
(“Protection of the debtor’s credit-worthiness with its vendors is vital to its successful 
reorganization.”). 
 163.  Markell, supra note 17, at 249-50. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id.  at 250. 
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claims.  Alternatively, the debtor can rebut the presumption of unfair 
discrimination by demonstrating “that contributions will be made by the 
assenting classes to the reorganization, and that these contributions are 
commensurate with the different treatment.”
166
  In other words, if the debtor 
can show that the favored class contributed offsetting new value, consistent 
with the Paradise Irrigation case under Chapter IX. 
The Markell Test, sometimes referred to as the Presumption-Based 
Standard, was designed to address two perceived problems with the Four 
Factor Test.  Primarily, it recognized that the Four Factors really boiled 
down to just this: “whether the proposed discrimination has a reasonable 
basis and is necessary for reorganization.”
167
  While this necessity standard 
may make sense in the Chapter 13 context in which there may be only one 
plan that the debtor is capable of confirming and carrying out, Markell 
argues that the concept of necessity is meaningless in the business 
bankruptcy Chapter 11 context: “Any nonindividual Chapter 11 case 
theoretically is capable of confirmation through plans which do not 
discriminate.”
168
 As examples, he says:  
 
a court could confirm a liquidation plan, or it could confirm a 
plan that extinguished all claims and interests, created one class 
of new equity interests, and then distributed those interests pro 
rata to creditors and equity holders.  With such a plan, which 
could be confirmed in any case, discrimination is wholly 
absent.
169
 
 
The second problem is that the Four Factor Test does not reflect the 
theory and function of the unfair discrimination rule (or of the cramdown 
requirements generally).  The Four Factor Test, as stated above, is drawn 
from Chapter 13’s unfair discrimination test, and the Chapter 13 test is one 
of creditor classification.  The cramdown requirements, on the other hand, 
do not deal with classification; rather, they concern distribution.  
Classification is a question of voting procedure; the unfair discrimination 
and fair and equitable rules, in contrast, are distributional.  As previously 
described, the distinction between classification and distribution is 
irrelevant in Chapter 13, as creditors do not vote on a plan of debt 
composition in that chapter.  But in Chapter 11, in which creditors do vote, 
classification and distribution questions are analytically distinct.  Courts are 
 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. at 243-44.  
 168.  Id. at 254. 
 169.  Id. 
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cognizant of this difference.
170
  Yet, the Four Factor Test redundantly 
contains some of the same elements as the tests for improper 
classification.
171
 
Further, Markell contends that the Four Factor Test, with its focus on 
the necessity of the discrimination, improperly focuses on questions of plan 
feasibility, i.e., a question of whether the plan is likely to succeed.
172
  That 
is, the inquiry as to whether discrimination is necessary for a successful 
reorganization is really a question of whether the discrimination makes the 
plan more feasible than it would be without the discrimination.  Feasibility 
questions, though, are separately handled under Section 1129(a)(11), which 
requires the court to find that the debtor is not likely to re-file for 
bankruptcy following confirmation.
173
 
The Markell Test eschews this classification-type language and 
relative feasibility analysis.  Instead, it proposes a test that reflects the old 
fair and equitable requirements’ function of limiting a debtor’s ability to 
allocate value in a way that disregarded the creditors’ ex ante expectations, 
namely, that the creditors would be paid before stockholders (the absolute 
priority rule) and that creditors of the same priority level would receive the 
same treatment.  These equitable principles also recognized that the debtor 
could nonetheless allocate value as compensation to creditors’ contribution 
to the reorganization. 
The Markell Test embodies these principles in the two ways in which 
a debtor can rebut the presumption of unfair discrimination: “If the 
treatment preserves the prebankruptcy expectations, or appropriately 
rewards contributions to reorganization, it should be permitted; if it 
unjustifiably frustrates those expectations, it should not.”
174
 
Thus, the Markell Test recognizes that the different treatment may be 
 
 170.  See e.g., In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Permitting 
separate classification of the Teamsters Committee’s claim does not automatically result in 
adoption of the plan. The Teamsters Committee is still protected by the provisions of 
subsections (a) and (b), particularly the requirements of subsection (b) that the plan not 
discriminate unfairly and that it be fair and equitable with respect to the Teamsters 
Committee’s claim.”); see also, In re Lightsquared Inc., 513 B.R. 56, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (noting that classification and unfair discrimination are separate issues that should be 
analyzed separately); Markell, supra note 17 at 241 (“Whether such discrimination 
‘discriminate[s] unfairly’ against the noncontributing classes is an issue distinct from the 
propriety of the separate classification, and one upon which bankruptcy courts have not yet 
reached a consensus.”). 
 171.  See, e.g., In re Lightsquared, 513 B.R. at 83, 99 (examining whether there was a 
rational basis for separate classification and whether the allegedly discriminatory treatment 
was justified by a rational basis). 
 172.  Markell, supra note 17 at 255. 
 173.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2010). 
 174.  Markell, supra note 17, at 252-53. 
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justified by examining the parties’ expectations, suggesting, for example, 
that a plan might provide for a greater recovery for tort claimants over 
voluntary claimants, such as bondholders, because “there is every reason to 
believe that tort claimants have, if anything, a higher expectation of 
payment.”
175
  Likewise, different treatment may be justified to compensate 
creditors that are essential to the reorganization. For example, a plan may 
distribute more to a labor union if that union’s good will is essential to the 
reorganization effort: “it is not unfair to return to that union more than its 
aliquot share of reorganization value since its efforts were responsible for 
the increase in that value.”
176
 
3. Analysis: “Necessity” and “New Value” 
The Markell Test’s structure is not only more workable and likely to 
yield more consistent results, but it is also, as Markell notes, more 
consistent with the traditional function and interpretation of the unfair 
discrimination rule.
177
  This rule is a distributional rule, providing a 
fundamental protection to dissenting classes of creditors, and it is not a 
classification rule.  Thus, reference to Chapter 13’s classification rule is 
slightly misplaced. 
As far as providing a workable rule, the Markell Test reflects a 
superior approach.  Instead of giving courts four redundant and, at times, 
self-referential factors to consider, the Markell Test provides a structure 
that reflects the purpose of the rule – to provide a baseline standard of 
equality among creditors – and justifications for deviating from this 
baseline. 
Theoretically, the Markell Test also provides a rule that is more 
consonant with the function of the cram down requirements.  Markell is 
absolutely right that classification questions should be treated separately 
from unfair discrimination questions.  The Four Factor Test, which 
contains significant overlap with the general approach to handling improper 
classification arguments, conflates these issues, or at least threatens to do 
so.
178
 
At the same time, though, the Markell Test shares some of the 
analytical shortcomings of the Four Factor Test.  In both, it is nearly 
 
 175.  Id. at 261. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 257. 
 178.  Some courts appear to have conflated these issues altogether, perhaps because the 
prevailing tests are so similar.  See, e.g., In re City of Colorado Springs Spring Creek Gen. 
Imp. Dist., 187 B.R. 683, 689 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (stating that issues of gerrymandering 
can and should be addressed as part of the “unfair discrimination” analysis of § 1129(b)). 
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inevitable for the court to apply the unfair discrimination rule without 
considering the necessity of the discrimination or the feasibility of the 
plan.
179
  Even though the Markell Test seems to avoid the Four-Factor 
Test’s inquiry into the necessity of the discrimination, ultimately, this 
necessity standard re-surfaces in the new value contribution analysis.  
Under the Four Factor Test, deviation from the principle of equality among 
creditors may be permitted if the court finds it is necessary to reorganize.
180
  
Under the Markell Test, deviation may be acceptable if it reflects a new 
contribution from the favored class, and if the favored class’s new 
contribution may be providing a service or value that is necessary to the 
reorganization effort.
181
  For example, when facing the question of whether 
a plan unfairly discriminates in favor of a class of creditors whose 
continued relationship with the debtor is important to the reorganization 
effort, it is necessary to determine whether the favored treatment is 
commensurate with the value of that continued relationship.
182
  Courts have 
applied the Four Factor Test to approve discrimination in favor of vendors 
when the “[p]rotection of the debtor’s credit-worthiness with its vendors is 
vital to is successful reorganization.”
183
  Likewise, a plan may discriminate 
in favor of a labor union when the debtor could not survive without the 
union and the discrimination “appears reasonably proportional to the 
consequences of failing to receive [the union’s] support.”
184
  The Markell 
test would likewise permit discrimination in these cases, as a plan that 
discriminates in favor of creditors whose continued work with the debtor 
may be considered a “contribution to preservation of value through the 
plan.”
185
  And Markell endorses the favored treatment for a key labor 
union: 
 
If, for example, the good will of a key union is necessary for the 
profitability of the reorganized debtor, and that necessity is 
proved by the plan proponent, then it is not unfair to return to that 
union more than its aliquot share of reorganization value since its 
efforts were responsible for the increase in that value.
186
 
 
 179.  See Pryor, supra note 9 (making a similar, but distinct, argument that the 
conflicting notions of requisite fairness under Chapter 9 serves a settlement inducing 
function). 
   180.    See supra text accompanying notes 160160-162 
   181.    See supra text accompanying notes 174-176 
   182.    Markell, supra note 17, at 250. 
 183.  In re Creekstone Apartments, 168 B.R. 639, 644 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994). 
 184.  In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting, 149 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
 185.  In re Sentry Operating Co. of Texas, 264 B.R. 850, 864 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001). 
 186.  Markell, supra note 17, at 261. 
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Thus, the Markell Test recognizes contributions to the reorganization effort 
not as “necessary to the reorganization” but as a contribution of value. 
Even though the Markell Test, then, does not eliminate the necessity 
factor, it improves the analysis of this factor by placing it within the more 
familiar language and framework of the new value analysis – an analysis 
applied in Avon Park and Paradise Irrigation.  Further, by placing the 
necessity analysis under the new value rule, the Markell Test also provides 
a theoretical limitation on the amount of permissible discrimination: the 
plan’s discrimination must be proportional to the amount of the new value 
contribution. 
In order to apply this theoretical limitation on the amount of 
discrimination, it is necessary to quantify the amount of that contribution.  
This problem has received significant attention as applied in the absolute 
priority context, i.e., when old shareholders contributed sufficient new 
value in order to justify their receiving value even when unsecured 
creditors are not paid in full.
187
  The absolute priority context is different in 
at least one important aspect; namely, Congress codified this rule in section 
1129(b)(2) but did not codify the unfair discrimination rule.
188
  The 
Supreme Court has intimated that, by codifying the absolute priority rule 
without mentioning the new value “rule,” Congress thereby eliminated the 
new value rule altogether.
189
  Since Congress has not codified the unfair 
discrimination rule, there can be no similar argument that Congress 
intended to foreclose the new value contribution as applied to unfair 
discrimination. 
Even assuming the new value rule continues to apply to the absolute 
priority rule, there has been substantial and significant debate over whether 
courts should apply a flexible or strict approach to measuring that new 
value contribution.
190
  Some have argued that the court should apply this 
rule more flexibly as needed to facilitate the debtor’s reorganization.
191
  
The argument is that the reorganized entity may not be able to succeed 
without the continuing input of the old owners.
192
  Others have argued that 
the rule should be applied narrowly, as a strict interpretation will help 
ensure that the residual class of claimants will ultimately make the decision 
 
 187.  Baird, supra note 86, at 584 n.37 (collecting cases and commentary about the new 
value corollary). 
 188.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2010). 
 189.  Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434 (1999); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
 190.  Baird, supra note 86, at 584-85. 
 191.  Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of the Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SERV. AM. L. 9 
(1991). 
 192.  Id. 
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of whether the debtor should liquidate or reorganize.
193
 
As David Skeel has argued, this uncertainty about the new value rule 
reflects the tension inherent in the two goals of corporate reorganization 
law – namely, “protection of creditors’ rights and the promotion of a 
successful reorganization of the debtor.”
194
  While in some cases these 
goals may overlap, in others they may very well diverge, and the 
Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance as to which goal should 
predominate.  This normative question underlines a major split among 
bankruptcy theorists.
195
  The crux of this split is a policy question about 
who should have control over the allocation of the reorganization surplus, 
the debtor or the creditors.  For those scholars who believe the primary goal 
of Chapter 11 is to maximize the value of the estate, creditors should have 
greater control over the allocation process.  Specifically, control should be 
in the hands of the class of creditors holding the residual claims against the 
debtor.
196
  These scholars view strict adherence to the absolute priority rule 
as giving control to these residual claimants.  For those scholars that 
believe the primary goal of bankruptcy is to facilitate the debtor’s 
reorganization – thus reducing the impact of corporate failure on investors, 
suppliers, employees, and the community – the debtor should retain control 
over the allocation of the reorganization surplus and should be allowed to 
deviate from the absolute priority rule when necessary to improve the 
debtor’s chance of recovery.
197
 
These questions – both doctrinal and normative – apply equally in the 
unfair discrimination rule context.  How courts should evaluate the asserted 
new value contribution raises the same issues in the unfair discrimination 
context as in the absolute priority context: to what degree should the plan 
proponents be free to deviate from a baseline distributional rule? 
The Markell Test does not answer this question, leaving bankruptcy 
courts with substantial leeway in determining the amount of the asserted 
new value contribution.  But by re-framing the “necessity” question as one 
of new value, this approach at least highlights the true nature of the 
necessity question and places it within a framework that is already 
relatively familiar to bankruptcy courts and the parties. 
 
 193.  Baird, supra note 86, at 583-84. 
 194.  David A. Skeel, The Uncertain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy’s 
Contribution Rule Doctrine After Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 223 (1989); see also 
Baird, supra note 86 at 584 (“This tension is reflected in the debate over what is called the 
‘new value exception’ to the absolute priority rule.”). 
 195.  Baird, supra note 86, at 583-84. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
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IV. THE UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION RULE IN CHAPTER 9 
There is good reason to think that unfair discrimination should mean 
the same thing in Chapter 9 as it does in Chapter 11 business 
reorganizations: the rule has the same historical roots in the two chapters 
and modern Chapter 9 directly incorporates the unfair discrimination rule 
from Chapter 11.  At the same time, given the different nature of 
municipalities and their stakeholders (pensioners, in particular), one might 
credibly argue, as did the Detroit bankruptcy court, that the rule might 
apply differently in municipal bankruptcies.  As discussed above, the 
Detroit confirmation order and opinion found the discrimination in favor of 
pensioners and bondholders to be fair “in light of, among other things, (a) 
the circumstances of the City’s Chapter 9 Case, (b) the purpose of chapter 
9, which is to adjust an insolvent municipality’s debt so that it can provide 
adequate municipal services and (c) the Court’s conscience, as informed by 
the Court’s experience, education, and sense of morality.”
198
 
In this section, I argue that, despite these mission-related and fairness 
concerns related to the vulnerability of municipal pensioners and other 
stakeholders, the unfair discrimination rule in municipal bankruptcy law 
should mean the same as it does in Chapter 11: the plan should not be able 
to treat one class of creditors substantially better than a similar class of 
dissenting creditors, unless that treatment comports with pre-bankruptcy 
expectations or reflects a new value contribution.  Mission-related and 
fairness concerns should matter, if at all, only to the extent that they satisfy 
either of these two justifications for discrimination.  Further, these mission-
related and fairness concerns are actually better addressed through this 
Chapter 11 approach. 
A. No Special Chapter 9 Unfair Discrimination Rule 
The statutory argument that the unfair discrimination rule should have 
the same meaning in Chapter 9 as in Chapter 11 is a simple and strong one: 
Chapter 9 directly incorporates the Chapter 11 rule into Chapter 9.
199
  When 
Congress intended Chapter 9 to vary from Chapter 11, it did so by either 
excluding specific provisions of Chapter 11 or by re-defining Chapter 11 
 
 198.  Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of 
Detroit at 22, ¶ 21, In re City of Detroit Bankr., No. 13-53846, (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 
2014), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/detroit/docket8272.pdf 
[hereinafter Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan]. 
 199.  See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2010) (incorporating Section 1129(b)(1)); see also Hynes 
& Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 637-38 (stating that Chapter 9 
indirectly relies on the implicit standard of unfair discrimination because section 901(a) 
imports by reference 1129(b)(1)). 
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concepts.  For example, Chapter 9 incorporates the absolute priority rule as 
pertaining to secured and unsecured creditors but not as to equity 
holders.
200
  Chapter 9 also uses the “best interests of creditors” language but 
separately defines that in Section 943(b)(7), rejecting the Chapter 11 
definition of that requirement.
201
  When Congress wanted to have a unique 
Chapter 9 rule, it explicitly did so, thus supporting a presumption that 
Congress did not intend a unique unfair discrimination rule.
202
 
This approach is in accord with the historical usage of the unfair 
discrimination rule in municipal bankruptcies.  The unfair discrimination 
rule was virtually identical in the original municipal and corporate 
bankruptcy laws, both drawing from the old fair and equitable principles 
developed in the equity receivership cases.
203
  And as seen in the Avon Park 
and Paradise Irrigation cases, courts used the business case law as support 
in interpreting the unfair discrimination rule under Chapter IX.
204
 
At the same time, though, the historical usage of the unfair 
discrimination rule may be inapposite to modern municipal bankruptcy law 
under Chapter 9.  Under the old Chapter IX, applicable to Avon Park and 
Paradise Irrigation, municipal bankruptcy served merely as a tool to 
impose a bond workout on dissenting bondholders.
205
  Even though a 
debtor under Chapter IX, in theory, could have impaired claims other than 
those of bondholders, the pre-arranged nature of Chapter IX bankruptcies 
made this practically impossible.  So these cases considered only whether a 
debtor could discriminate among bondholders and never considered the 
question of value allocation among different classes of creditors.  Thus, this 
case law may be of limited value as applied to Chapter 9, which gives 
debtors significantly more leeway to propose a plan that will impair the 
claims of other stakeholders, such as those of contract counterparties, 
employees, and retirees. 
The relatively broader scope of current Chapter 9 than its predecessor 
Chapter IX supports a more flexible interpretation of unfair discrimination 
in modern municipal bankruptcies.  David Skeel has opined that a court 
should have wide latitude in determining whether a plan favoring 
pensioners unfairly discriminates against bondholders and other unsecured 
creditors, arguing that the court should be free to take into account the 
 
 200.  See 11 U.S.C. §901(a) (2010) (incorporating section 1129(b)(2)(A) & (B) but not 
section(C), the latter of which applies to equity holders).  
 201.  11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2005). 
 202.  Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 637-38. 
 203.  Supra part II.A.  
 204.  Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S 536, 541 (1946); Am. United Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S. 138, 147 (1940).  
 205.  See supra Part III.A. 
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financial impact of municipal bankruptcy law on pensioners.
206
  In Detroit, 
this would mean taking into account that the pensions were modest – not 
the sort of eye-brow raising pensions occasionally reported in California or 
elsewhere – that Michigan has elected to remove its public employees from 
the Social Security system, and that the pensioners were already giving up 
some of their medical benefits.
207
  Thus, the financial impact of impairing 
pensions would likely be greater than that of impairing bond obligations, 
arguably justifying better treatment for the pensioners than the 
bondholders. 
These fairness considerations are extremely compelling, as pensioners 
are a sympathetic group of claimants; however, they are inconsistent with 
the way courts have applied the unfair discrimination rule under Chapter IX 
and in modern Chapter 11 cases.
208
  Historically, the rule has not focused 
on the characteristics of the favored stakeholders, even when those 
stakeholders are similarly sympathetic.
209
  Further, the history of the unfair 
discrimination rule and its current statutory formulation demonstrate 
Congressional intent that the rule have the same meaning in Chapters 9 and 
11.  That is, there is no support for creating a special Chapter 9 unfair 
discrimination rule. 
This does not mean the fairness concerns are irrelevant; rather, it 
means those considerations are relevant only to the extent those 
considerations inform the inquiry into whether the discrimination comports 
with the parties’ ex ante expectations or their new value contributions. 
Thus, discrimination in favor of pensioners is not fair because pensioners 
are a more vulnerable group; however, favoring pensioners may be justified 
if that outcome is consistent with the parties’ ex ante expectations or with 
 
 206.  Skeel, supra note 9, at 19 (arguing that “[w]ith the pensions, no unfair 
discrimination may allow Detroit to take into consideration the fact that Detroit’s pensions 
are relatively modest, and that Detroit’s pensioners are excluded from the social security 
system and thus do not have the same ‘backup’ protection as most other workers.”).  Note, 
though, that Judge Rhodes has stated multiple times in Detroit’s bankruptcy that the retirees’ 
hardship should not be a factor, and he reiterated that point in the opening arguments of the 
plan confirmation trial. See Nathan Bomey and Matt Helms, Attorney: ‘Detroit Won’t 
Recover’ Without Grand Bargain, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/02/detroit-bankruptcy-trial-what-to-
expect/14952855/ (reporting on Detroit’s chief bankruptcy lawyer’s opening arguments for 
the plan of adjustment where he argues that pensioners be protected from severe cuts). 
 207.  Skeel, supra note 9, at 25. 
 208.  Hynes & Walt, Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 637 (“Our point is 
simply that, in other reorganization chapters, courts do not allow use of this standard to give 
priority to creditors who are at least as sympathetic. It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that the unfair discrimination standard, as applied in Chapter 9, does not allow a plan to 
favor retirees based on their dire financial circumstances.”). 
 209.  Id. 
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the resultant value to the estate. 
The following section considers how the Markell Test – in particular 
the new value corollary – can more effectively address these fairness and 
mission-based concerns. 
B. Fairness and Mission-Based Concerns in the Markell Test 
The prior section argued that courts should apply the same unfair 
discrimination rule in both Chapters 9 and 11, despite the special policy 
concerns that arise under Chapter 9.  This section contends that the fairness 
and mission-based concerns expressed by some commentators and by the 
Detroit confirmation order and opinion are better addressed through the 
Chapter 11 Markell Test.  This approach provides greater predictability as 
to the application of the unfair discrimination rule; it provides an analytical 
tool for determining not merely whether discrimination may be appropriate 
but the acceptable degree of that discrimination; and it provides a better 
means of evaluating the claims of involuntary claimants, such as those in 
Detroit’s class of Other Unsecured Creditors.
210
 
The Markell Test takes into account fairness and mission-related 
concerns to the extent they are related to the parties’ ex ante expectations or 
their contributions to the reorganization.  For example, the pensioners and 
bondholders may both have understood that, in the event of default, 
pensioners would receive favored treatment based on the state 
constitutional protections for pensions.  As with any expectation-based 
factor, there is a potential circularity to this argument: because courts are 
likely to be sympathetic to pensioners, bondholders should expect to 
receive less than pensioners in bankruptcy.  But to the extent the parties’ 
expectations are based on their expected treatment under state law, there is 
no circularity problem. 
The mission-related concerns that motivated the Detroit bankruptcy 
court’s interpretation of unfair discrimination may be encompassed, at least 
to some degree, in the new value corollary.  For example, favoring 
pensioners may be justified in return for the pensioners’ agreement to 
support the plan.  Such a settlement may be a significant contribution to the 
debtor’s ability to confirm a plan of adjustment.  Likewise, favoring 
pensioners may be justified by the offsetting value to the city in retaining 
current employees and attracting future ones. 
The benefit of analyzing fairness and mission-based concerns through 
the Markell Test is that is not only helps identify whether any 
discrimination would be fair but also how much discrimination would be 
 
 210.  Supra note 100 (defining “Other Unsecured Creditors”). 
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fair.  The discrimination must be proportionate to the parties’ state-law-
based expectations or their contributions.  Thus, the Markell Test helps 
provide a limiting principle on the degree to which the debtor may 
discriminate. 
This limiting principle, though, depends on the debtor’s ability to 
quantify, at least approximately, the parties’ expectations and new value 
contributions.  As discussed supra in Part III.B.3, measuring the amount of 
any non-cash new value contribution is difficult, thus potentially 
undermining the benefit of any limiting principle.  While the new value 
corollary has deep roots in municipal bankruptcy, the appropriate means for 
quantifying that new value contribution is unclear.  Thus in Paradise 
Irrigation, the court held that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was 
entitled to superior treatment under the plan because it had financed the 
plan.
211
  And in Avon Park, the court suggested that R.C. Crummer might 
be entitled to superior treatment for its services in negotiating the debt 
composition plan.
212
  Despite this long-held acceptance of the new value 
corollary in unfair discrimination cases, it is not clear how courts should 
measure the favored party’s contributions. 
As discussed in Part III.B.3, courts have examined this in Chapter 11 
cases in the context of the absolute priority rule.  Courts have interpreted 
the new value corollary in a narrow way, based on Congress’s codification 
of the absolute priority rule in Section 1129(b)(2).
213
 This narrow 
interpretation in the absolute priority rule context also comports with the 
Chapter 11 policy of placing asset deployment decisions in the hands of the 
residual claimants.
214
 
In the unfair discrimination analysis, there is obviously no similar 
statutory interpretation argument supporting a narrow reading of the new 
value corollary.  Congress decided not to define unfair discrimination.  In 
Chapter 9, the policy justification for a narrow reading is also weaker.  The 
policy of Chapter 9 is to facilitate a city’s debt restructuring to enable the 
city to continue providing services.  Unlike Chapter 11, there is no 
municipal bankruptcy policy of maximizing returns to creditors. 
With this more straightforward policy goal, the interpretation of the 
new value rule is likewise more straightforward: it gives the debtor 
flexibility to depart from the Bankruptcy Code’s vertical and horizontal 
limits on allocating the reorganization surplus. 
This greater flexibility is not only consistent with Chapter 9’s goals 
but also with its structure.  Congress has consciously drafted municipal 
 
 211.  Supra Part III.A(2). 
 212.  Supra Part III.A(1). 
 213.  Supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text. 
 214.  Baird, supra note 86, at 586. 
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bankruptcy law to minimize federal intrusion into local municipal fiscal 
affairs, so as to avoid the constitutional concerns that led the Court to 
overturn the first municipal bankruptcy law.
215
  Greater flexibility, 
accordingly, is consistent with this “light touch” approach, as it gives 
debtor municipalities greater control over the surplus. 
Leaving this control over the reorganization surplus in the hands of the 
bankrupt city is perhaps problematic.  Some have argued that Chapter 9’s 
“hands-off” approach to local governance could invite cities to strategically 
use bankruptcy in order to impose the costs of poor financial decisions on 
to creditors.
216
  Some have argued that courts can, and perhaps should, 
exercise more control over the debtor’s resource allocation decisions.
217
  
Even though the Code forbids such intrusion into local governance (absent 
consent by the city), these commentators have argued that courts can 
effectively assert control by strictly interpreting the confirmation 
requirements.
218
 
Leaving aside the normative question of whether bankruptcy courts 
should have greater involvement in local governance of bankrupt cities, as 
a positive matter Congress has chosen to leave local governance in the 
 
 215.  See Moringiello, supra note 20 at 410-11. 
 216.  Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 285-86 (2012) (stating that “[p]erhaps less 
benignly, municipalities that could bear resource adjustments may refuse to fund obligations 
because residents regret having taken a risk that subsequently materialized and believe that 
relief from another source—a more centralized government or the creditors themselves—is 
plausible. Bailout or bankruptcy, that is, may be seen as a viable alternative to resource 
adjustments. Eric Monkkonen’s study of late nineteenth-century municipal defaults, largely 
precipitated by overinvestment in railroad aid and other ‘internal improvements,’ concluded 
that localities systematically could afford to avoid default but preferred to impose the costs 
of imprudently incurred obligations on creditors rather than to require that residents bear 
them.”). 
 217.  Hynes & Walt, supra note 9, Pensions & Property Rights, at 624 (arguing that 
“[f]or this reason, the bankruptcy court in effect has the power to control the municipality’s 
use of its assets to pay retirees. Thus, even if the court lacks the legal authority to control the 
municipality’s spending, it can take measures that induce the municipality to limit its 
spending. In any realistic (practical) sense, the court has power over the municipality’s use 
of its assets in a Chapter 9 case.”); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 45, at 474 
(pointing out that “[f]ederal bankruptcy courts have been explicitly denied any such powers. 
But in practice, the bankruptcy court may have more authority than at first appears. To be 
sure, the court may not order reductions in expenditure, sale of property, renegotiation of 
contracts, or increase in taxes. But the court can refuse to accept the city’s debt adjustment 
plan on the ground that it is not in the ‘best interests of the creditors.’ This provision could 
be interpreted to mean that the city is capable of taking steps that would be more 
advantageous to the creditors than defaulting, and in most instances this probably means 
cutting spending, selling property, or raising taxes. Either of the first two interpretations 
would represent a stretch—at least as measured by the cases cited in the relevant legislative 
history—but ordering the levy of previously authorized taxes would not.”). 
 218.  Id. 
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hands of the bankrupt city.  A strict interpretation of unfair discrimination, 
then, is inconsistent with this chosen policy. 
This does not mean, of course, that a municipal debtor is absolutely 
free to allocate value as it wishes, nor is this an argument that a debtor 
should be so free.  A bankrupt city, like any Chapter 11 debtor, must be 
able to show that the discrimination is offset by new value from the favored 
party.  The difference is that, due to the nature and scope of Chapter 9, 
courts should be more deferential to the city’s judgment as to the value of 
the favored party’s contribution. 
C. Application to Detroit 
Applying the Markell Test – along with the proposed flexible 
interpretation of the new value corollary – to Detroit’s bankruptcy 
confirmation reveals that this test sufficiently, and in some ways more 
effectively, addresses many of the fairness and mission-related concerns 
underlying the Detroit court’s opinion. 
The court broadly stated that unfair discrimination is to be determined 
according to the court’s judgment of its conscience regarding that 
discrimination.”
219
  In elaborating on the factors that should inform that 
judgment, the court identified four: (1) the overall purpose of Chapter 9, (2) 
the policy preferences of the state, (3) the reasonable expectation of the 
parties, and (4) the interrelated nature of the settlements that facilitated the 
plan.
220
 
The third factor neatly falls within the Markell Test framework by 
focusing on whether the discrimination is consistent with the parties’ ex 
ante expectations.  Likewise, the second factor – the policy preferences of 
the state – may also be understood as relating to the parties’ expectations, 
as Michigan’s constitutional pension protections would inform the parties’ 
reasonable expectations. 
The second factor, however, does more than this.  It suggests that the 
court should defer to the distribution policies of the state of Michigan.
221
  
This raises an interesting overall question about the relationship of federal 
and state law in municipal bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy law generally does not 
honor state distribution rights, unless expressed as property rights.
222
  
 
 219.  Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes, supra note 15, at 29-30. 
 220.  Id. at 30-32. 
 221.  Id. at 31. 
 222.  See Skeel, supra note 36, at 2 (“As similar as liens and priorities are, the 
bankruptcy laws have long drawn a sharp distinction between state-created liens, which are 
honored in bankruptcy; and state-created priorities, which are not.”); Hynes & Walt, 
Pensions & Property Rights, supra note 9, at 647 (“Congress was aware of the place of non-
property based priorities under the original Bankruptcy Act and their restriction under the 
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Municipal bankruptcy law might be different, however, since the 
Bankruptcy Code does not impose a distribution priority in Chapter 9, aside 
from administrative expense priorities.
223
 This point raises an important 
federalism issue outside the scope of this article; however, it is relevant in 
demonstrating the court’s concern about interfering with local governance.  
That concern is consistent with the more flexible interpretation of the new 
value corollary, as advocated in Part IV.B. 
The inter-related nature of the settlements undergirding the city’s plan 
of adjustment also fits within the framework of the new value corollary.  
The settlements have a value to the estate that potentially justify any 
discrimination in favor of the settling parties. 
The mission-based justification does not appear to fit at all in the 
Markell Test.  This justification actually argues against incorporating any 
Chapter 11 case law into Chapter 9.  The court’s approach effectively 
introduces a necessity factor: discrimination is justified if it is necessary to 
allow the city to continue to provide services.  Discrimination in favor of 
pensioners, then, is justified because it is an investment in the city’s 
relationship with its employees; in contrast, the court held that the city “has 
no similar mission-related investment in its relationships with its other 
unsecured creditors.”
224
 
In some ways, this mission-related factor is similar to the new value 
corollary.  While the mission-related factor asks whether the discrimination 
will help the city continue to provide services, the new value approach asks 
whether the favored treatment compensates those who will contribute to the 
city’s ongoing ability to provide services.  The differences are potentially 
two-fold.  As discussed in the prior section, the new value approach has the 
benefit of evaluating whether the extent of the discrimination is necessary.  
That is, the city can discriminate in favor of the contributing party, but only 
to the extent of the contribution’s value. 
The second difference is that the court’s approach does not require 
that the benefitted party actually contribute anything; rather, the mission-
related justification merely asks whether the discrimination is related to the 
city’s ability to continue providing services.  Hence, the court did not say 
that the favored pensioners would actually help the city continue to provide 
services.  Instead, the court found that favoring pensioners is consistent 
with city’s interests in “preserving its relationships with its employees and 
 
Chandler Act. It decided not to incorporate priorities set by state law into the Code and 
supplied instead a set of bankruptcy priorities. A fair inference is that current bankruptcy 
law does not recognize non-bankruptcy priorities that are not based on property rights.”). 
 223.  11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2010) (incorporating by reference only the administrative 
priority found in § 507(a)(2)). 
 224.  Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes, supra note 15, at 31. 
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in enhancing their motivations.”
225
 
The new value approach, in contrast, may be read as requiring that the 
pensioners’ themselves actually contribute the offsetting value.
226
  Since the 
pensioners are retired, the favored treatment is actually for work already 
performed, not for new contributions.
227
  Even under this interpretation of 
the new value rule, the pensioners contributed new value by withdrawing 
their objections to the bankruptcy, waiving claims against the state, and 
supporting the plan.  In addition, a court may find that favoring the 
pensioners provides a goodwill value to the city, which in turn provides the 
benefits identified by the court.  Indeed, this argument is implicit in the 
court’s oral opinion, recognizing that favoring pensioners is important to 
the city’s relationship with its workers.
228
 
The Markell Test, then, would provide a more predictable approach 
for interpreting the unfair discrimination rule.  It would also provide some 
limiting principle of the degree of the discrimination.  Even more so, 
though, it would provide a better lens through which to analyze the claims 
of the tort claimants in the class of Other Unsecured Creditors.  The court 
examines the objections of the tort claimants through the mission-based 
lens.  Tort claimants, obviously, have no contribution to the city’s ability to 
continue providing services.  Under this approach, the debtor could propose 
to pay tort creditors only pennies on the dollar of their claims.  Yet, 
Detroit’s plan proposes to pay them approximately 13%.
229
 
The court’s mission-based approach does not inform the question of 
whether this is an appropriate level of distribution, relative to the other 
classes of unsecured creditors.  The court’s approach can only say whether 
the city is justified in discriminating between classes of tort claimants, 
pensioners, and bondholders. 
The Markell Test’s expectations-based rule, on the other hand, might 
lead to a contrary conclusion.  Tort creditors, obviously, did not voluntarily 
extend credit to the city, and thus it is a stretch to consider their 
expectations at the time they became creditors.  Nonetheless, the 
expectation-based approach of the Markell Test might actually argue in 
favor of paying tort creditors even more than other creditors, as it is 
reasonable to believe that most people would expect that a tort victim 
 
 225.  Id. at 30-31. 
 226.  Hynes & Walt, Fair & Unfair Discrimination, supra note 9, at 16-17 (making the 
argument that: “The problem with the contribution justification is that the greater recovery 
received by many active and former workers will vastly exceed the contribution they make 
to the municipality’s recovery.  This is certainly true of retirees, as they contribute nothing 
to the city’s reorganization; they have retired.”). 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes, supra note 15, at 30-31. 
 229.  Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan, supra note 198, at  22, ¶ 20. 
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would be paid in full if run over by a city bus.  Thus, in the Chapter 11 
context, Markell has argued that “there is every reason to believe that tort 
claimants have, if anything, a higher expectation of payment.”
230
 
Tort claimants, however, are difficult to fit into any analysis, simply 
because of their nature as involuntary creditors.
231
  Nonetheless, the 
Markell Test provides a more workable structure for considering the claims 
of such creditors. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the unfair discrimination rule has largely operated in the 
shadows of the absolute priority rule in corporate reorganizations, Detroit’s 
bankruptcy demonstrates that it is likely to play a significant role in 
shaping municipal debt readjustment plans.  This is particularly so in cases 
in which the debtor seeks to impair its pension obligations. 
Despite important differences between corporate reorganizations and 
municipal bankruptcies, this article contends that the unfair discrimination 
rule, as understood and articulated in the Markell Test, should apply 
equally in Chapter 9 as in Chapter 11.  Although Chapter 9 raises a host of 
policy questions and fairness concerns that might not be relevant in most or 
any Chapter 11 cases, these concerns do not support creating a Chapter 9-
specific unfair discrimination rule.  In both Chapters 9 and 11, the debtor 
should be able to discriminate in favor of a class of creditors only if that 
discrimination is proportionate to the favored party’s ex ante expectations 
of payment or the party’s ex post contribution of new value. 
The Markell Test can effectively address municipal bankruptcy policy 
concerns if courts properly construe the new value corollary.  While courts 
have interpreted this rule more narrowly in corporate bankruptcies in the 
context of the absolute priority rule, there is no statutory support for 
similarly interpreting the new value corollary narrowly in the unfair 
discrimination context.  Further, while there may be some policy grounds 
for a narrow interpretation of new value in Chapter 11 even as applied to 
the unfair discrimination rule, the policy of Chapter 9 argues in favor of a 
more flexible interpretation. 
Accordingly, even though Chapter 9 and Chapter 11 both use the same 
rule to prohibit unfair discrimination against a dissenting class of creditors, 
courts should grant greater deference to a municipal debtor’s evaluation of 
creditors’ contributions to the reorganization effort.  This more flexible 
 
 230.  Markell, supra note 17, at 261. 
    231.   Melissa Jacoby, Detroit’s Bankruptcy:  End(s) and Means, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 10, 
2014) http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/11/detroits-restructuring-ends-and-
means.html#more. 
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approach to applying the unfair discrimination rule is consistent with the 
structure of Chapter 9 and the policy underlying it, as Congress has 
deliberately crafted municipal bankruptcy law to limit federal interference 
in municipal governance.  Such a deferential approach also advances the 
purpose of Chapter 9, which is to enable a municipal debtor to confirm a 
plan of debt adjustment with its creditors in order to continue providing 
services to its residents. 
Properly construed, the Markell Test can more effectively evaluate the 
fairness of a debtor’s proposed discrimination, providing not only a 
framework for identifying when discrimination may be appropriate but also 
a framework for identifying how much discrimination may be appropriate.  
Further, the Markell Test provides a superior framework for evaluating the 
relative distributions among not only pensioners and bondholders, but also 
involuntary creditors. 
 
